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Introduction 
The object of this paper is to inquire primarily into 
the possibility of the International Court of Justice 
(hereinafter "the Court") granting an injunction to one 
State against another State for the pollution of the 
environment of the plaintiff State.
1 
But logically, it seems necessary also to devote some 
discussion to the basis of a State's liability for polluting 
the environment of another State. In other words, it is 
necessary to establish the fact that the pollution by one 
State of the environment of another State is illegal in 
international law. 
This paper therefore will consist of two parts. 
first will be an enquiry into what we may call the 
The 
international law of pollution of the environment while 
1. There appears to be a dearth of commentaries on the power 
of the Court to issue an injunction. Writing in 1934, 
Hudson devoted two sentences to this question in a 
footnote to his book: "Perhaps the Court has power to 
issue an injunction.... In the Chorzow Factory case, 
the question was raised but an answer to it was not 
thought to be necessary. Series A, No. 17, p. 59". 
Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 
p. 420 fn 59 (1934 ed.). The Statute of the Court 
does not confer any explicit power to grant an injunction; 
but we shall see that this is probably immaterial. The 
1958 ILC Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure states in 
Article 19 that a tribunal has the power to "decide on 
any ancillary claims which it considers to be inseparable 
from the subject-matter of the dispute and necessary for 
its final settlement". It is doubtful whether one can 
read into this power, the power to issue an injunction 
as the claim for an injunction is not necessarily an 
"ancillary claim". 
2. 
the second part will discuss the judicial remedies, 
particularly the remedy of injunction, which may be available 
to a State injured by the extra-territorial pollution of 
another State. 
While a general discussion of the international law of 
pollution may appear desirable in itself, such an enterprise 
will not be attempted by the writer. Instead, the writer 
would wish to concentrate on only one particular aspect of 
this matter, namely, the pollution of the atmosphere of a 
State's environment. In this way, it is hoped that our 
inquiry would be more manageable. However, it will be seen 
that owing to the developing and uncertain nature of the law 
of international pollution, it may not be possible to establish 
principles of liability for atmospheric pollution without 
reference also to other aspects of the international law of 
pollution. For example, it may be necessary to refer to the 
laws governing pollution of inter-state rivers and of the sea 
to buttress the regime governing atmospheric pollution. This 
interrelation will be developed in the course of this paper. 
PART I: POLLUTION 
1. Some Facts About the Pollution of the Environment 
Numerous monographs and articles have already been written 
concerning the scientific aspects of the pollution of the 
environment. The object of this sub-section is mainly to 
establish a general definition of pollution from a legal 
point of view. 
3. 
Unfortunately, many legal articles on pollution seem 
to avoid a legal definition of the meaning of "pollution". 
2 
The reason for this seems to be an obvious one, namely, that 
pollution is a scientific phenomenon and as such is only to 
be properly defined in a scientific way. Even in this 
regard, the scientists are not at one in finding the best 
scientific definition or test of when a particular environ-
ment has crossed the threshold of being "polluted". For 
instance, Professor David W. Ehrenfeld would prefer, in the 
marine environment, the test of the conditions of the acquatic 
community of plants and animals to chemical indicators 
d d b b . 1 . 3 popularly a opte y 10 ogists. 
Another reason for the difficulty of obtaining a clear-
cut definition of pollution •~ the numerous and diverse 
manners in which the environment of a place may become 
polluted. The causes of pollution evade any delimitation. 
In general, they arise as a result of II science and technology", 
by the human mind to "go on discovering, inventing, creating 
and advancing".
4 
The media of pollution may also take many 
2. It is only necessary to cite one instance for this 
proposition: see Schachter and Serwer, Marine Pollution 
Problems and Remedies, 65 Am. J. Int'l Law 84 (1971). 
3 • 
4. 
Proceedings of the Conference on International and 
Interstate Regulation of Water Pollution, Columbia 
University, March 12-13, 1970, p. 3. 
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972. Section 1, 
Proclamations 1 and 3. 
4. 
forms, but in general, they may be grouped under three heads, 
namely, via water, the air and a direct disposal of waste on 
the land by man. The results of pollution are of many forms: 
pollution of the high seas by oil, pollution of international 
rivers by sewage, detergents and other wastes, pollution of 
the oceans by the disposal of chemical and biological weapons, 
radioactive pollution of all environments, pesticide pollution, 
air pollution by industrial processes, automobiles and aero-
planes, extraterrestrial contamination, noise pollution, 
depletion of wild life such as fisheries, birds and animals, 
and many other types of pollution.
5 
Owing to the nature of pollution therefore, it appears 
almost impossible to attempt a definition of the word 
"pollution" itself. Indeed, the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
on the human environment
6 
seems to have avoided giving an 
analytical definition of pollution. Instead, the Conference 
concentrates on the possible dangers that may affect man's 
environment if this environment is not "properly used" by man. 
However, at the highest level of abstraction, "pollution" may 
be defined as the "harm" caused to an environment by man made 
activities such as science and technology. The word "harm" 
5. 
6. 
This non-exhaustive list is based on a table provided by 
D. Livingston, Science, Technology, and International Law, 
in Black and Falk, The Future of International Legal 
Order, Volume IV, pp. 97-102 (1972). 
Supra, fn 4. 
t -~ 
\.J 
5. 
may be detected in the report of the Stockholm Conference 
itself. Hence, for instance, in Proclamation 3 of the 
Conference, the words "incalculable harm to human beings 
and the human environment" are used. Similarly, in 
Proclamation 6, we find the words "massive and irreversible 
harm". 
The ingredient of harm is to be found also with respect 
to the atmosphere in the '"Declaration of Principles" on Air 
7 Pollution Control' by the Council of Europe. The Preamble 
to this Declaration states, inter alia: 
"As air is essential to life, its natural quality 
must be maintained in order to safeguard man's 
health and well-being and to protect his environ-
ment. Air is deemed to be polluted when the 
presence of a foreign substance or a variation 
in the proportion of its components is liable to 
have a harmful effect or to cause nuisance." 
(Emphasised) 
By this definition, it is seen that pollution of the air 
occurs not merely when there is actual harm done to air but 
also when the introduction of foreign substances (as opposed 
to the natural quality of air) is liable to have a harmful 
8 
effect. In addition, it is also seen that the tort of 
7. Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers: Resolution 
(68)4. 1968 European Yearbook 381. 
8. In the David Davies Memorial Institute of International 
Studies' Draft Rules Concerning Changes in the Environment 
of the Earth (1964), changes in the environment of the Earth 
are prohibited, inter alia, "if the changes may be 
reasonably expected (a) to have a deleterious effect upon 
the life, health or growth, of human beings or of animals 
or plants". Rule 2(1). It is clear that the word 
"deleterious" is not different in meaning from "harmful". 
The Draft Rules can be found in Jenks, Space Law, 430 
( 196 5) . 
t -:; 
'v 
6. 
nuisance is added as an alternative ingredient in the definition 
of pollution. But this alternative head may not be a true one 
as nuisance is, in many instances, an activity with a harmful 
effect. 
It hardly requires much elaboration to make the point that 
pollution of the air and its likely harm to the air itself is 
also a harm or potential harm to man's health and well-being 
as well as to the environment in general. This inter-
dependence of cause and effect is a fact that can be accepted 
without much dispute. 
Controversy will, of course, rage large as to the degree 
of actual or potential harm that may be done to an environment 
by a particular form of activity. In an environment of 
intensified industrialisation as for instance in Western Europe, 
there will be real difficulties in tracing the source of a 
particular pollutant. Such difficulties have been referred 
b 
. 9 to y some writers. But the difficulty is mentioned not to 
illustrate the futility of pollution litigation, rather only 
9. See again, Schachter & Sewer, op. cit., supra, fn 2 at 105 
and also fn 67 where an article by Michael Hardy, 
International Control of Marine Pollution, in the 
collection of essays in memory of John McMahon (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London) is cited in 
support. A more alarming fact of pollution is that some 
pollution does not necessarily provide clear-cut scientific 
evidence of its danger before it becomes serious or 
irreversible. This "buffer effect" of the ecosystem is 
referred to by Professor Ehrenfeld in the Columbia 
University Conference on Water Pollution, op. cit., 
supra, fn 3 at p. 7. 
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7. 
as an obstacle to be overcome. h · 1 1 b. . lO Te Trai Sme ter Ar itration 
offers an illustration of the possibility of determining 
pollution scientifically. . 11 d One writer has offere some 
useful advice to lawyers on the practical steps which may be 
followed in the marshalling of evidence. 
Finally, it may be mentioned that pollution of the air 
and consequently, the environment, arises in two contexts: 
pollution may originate from a continuing process of a 
particular activity. Here, the polluting agents (i.e. foreign 
substances) are introduced to the air in a cumulative, 
repetitive fashion. On the other hand, the air of a State 
may also be polluted by a sudden "accident" occuring to a 
particular activity carried on in a neighbouring State. 
Here, the polluting agents are introduced at a fixed point 
. . . d h" 12 in time and in a su den fas ion. But it is also conceivable 
that some activities may fall between these two categories. 
For example, in the area of atmospheric nuclear testing, the 
radioactive debris may only be introduced into the atmosphere 
not for a continuing period of time but for a fixed period, 
say, a month per annum. In such a case, it may be difficult 
10. 3 UNRIAA 1905 (1949). 
11. John C. Ross, Environmental Law: Air Quality Litigation 
in the El Pasa-Juanrez Area, 12 Natural Resources Journal 
551 (1972). 
12. See for instance, Jenks, The Scope and Nature of Ultra-
Hazardous Liability in International Law, 117 Hague 
Recueil, 121, 127 (1966). 
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8. 
to classify this type of pollution as occurring out of an 
"accident" for the nature of a nuclear test is an act 
'TI'\11.. 
deliberately and carefully executed by nuclear testing S~~. 
A 
2. The International Law of Pollution with Special 
Reference to Air Pollution: Introduction 
At the outset, it is well to concede that the 
international law of pollution is not as clear-cut, definite 
13 
and certain as some other branches of international law. 
1 2
14 . . 
The recent Stockholm Conference 97 recognises this fact 
and enunciates in Principle 22 the following directive: 
"States shall co-operate to develop further 
the international law regarding liability 
and compensation for the victims of pollution 
and other environmental damage caused by 
activities within the jurisdiction and 
control of such states to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction." 
14a . d . However, one commentator has pointe out that while 
Principle 22 contains merely a promise that states shall 
co-operate to develop further the international law regarding 
liability for env ironmental damage, the word "further" 
contains an admission that some law on the subject already 
13. For a test as to whether obligatory norms have been 
established in international law, see Oscar Schachter, 
Towards a Theory of International Obligation in The 
Effectiveness of International Decisions, p. 9 at 16-17 
(1971). 
14. Op. cit., supra, fn 4. 
14a. L. B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, 14 Har. Int'l L.J. 423 at 495. 
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9. 
exists. Hence, Principle 21, which shall be discussed later, 
is a recognition of this existence. The whole of this sub-
section is a further attempt to discuss the "some law" of 
. 14b 
international pollution. Firstly, we shall discuss the 
territorial nature of a State's claim, then the basic elements 
of State responsibility and its relevance, the substantive 
law of international pollution, international agreements and 
finally a short discussion of ultra-hazardous activities. 
(i) The Territorial Nature of a State's Claim 
As one of the reasons for holding the Albanian authorities 
liable for their acts in the Corfu Channel case, the Court 
enunciated a "general and well-recognized" principle which 
has often been quoted since. This principle was that every 
State is under an obligation "not to knowingly allow its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
States". 1949, p. 22. 
What are the territorial rights of a State? In the field 
of pollution, it will be submitted that one of these rights is 
the right of a State to be free from extra-territorial pollution 
of its environment by another State in the absence of consent. 
But what is the fundamental basis of this right, if indeed 
14b. Many books and articles are presently being written on 
this subject. For a collection of recent writings on 
this subject see S. A. Bleicher, An Overview of 
International Environmental Regulation, 2 Ecology Law 
Quarterly, p. 2 (1972) and references therein. 
10. 
there is such a right? 
For a State to exist it must have some territory.
15 
The 
relation of a State to its territory is to a substantial degree 
analogous to or identical with that of a proprietary right of 
. 1 d 16 an owner over his an. But in addition to being the 
object of its proprietary rights, the territory is the basis 
upon which and the area wherein the State exercises jurisdiction 
. f . . h . d . . . 16a in con ormity wit its own law an with the air space above it. 
"The territory is both the object of the State's right and the 
space within which its sovereignty and jurisdiction are 
exercised". 
17 
It is a well-settled rule in international law that the 
territory of a State is invoilable in many instances.
18 
But 
whether this invoilability includes invasion by pollutants 
through the atmosphere depends in turn on the basis of this 
invoilability. 
Part of the problem which confronts our enquiry is the 
15. Lauterpacht, International Law, vol. 1. The General Works 
368 (1970); "Territory is for States a sine qua non and 
lies at the very roots of contemporary international law:" 
Holder and Bresnam, The International Legal System, 319 (1972i 
16. Lauterpacht, id. 368; Brierly, The Law of Nations, 163 (1963); 
Starke, Introduction to International Law 155 (1967). 
16a. Lauterpacht, id. 369. 
17. Lauterpacht, id. 369. 
18. 2 Moore, Digest of International Law 362-482; 2 Hackworth, 
Digest of International Law 282-334. 
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11. 
confusion arising out of the words "territory", "sovereignty", 
and "jurisdiction". For instance, two writers, commenting 
on the legality of the "U-2 Incident" in the USSR in 1960 
seemed to have employed the words "territory" and "sovereignty" 
liberally.
19 
Both Wright and Lissitzyn had no doubts that 
the overflight of the United States U-2 was illegal but the 
words they chose to describe this illegality differ. For 
Wright, it was a breach of "the principle of respect by 
20 States for the territory and independence of other States" 
whereas Lissitzyn would say that the failure of the United 
States to protest against the action of the Soviet authorities 
provided '' additional evidence that national sovereignty in 
' ' 1 f ' ' II 21 airspace is a rue o customary international law Writing 
in a different context altogether, Lauterpacht himself says, 
"International law recognises liability for a series of ... 
well-defined defects such as breaches of treaty obligations, 
denial of justice, violations of territorial sovereignty 
Sovereignty was described by the Arbitrator, Max Huber, 
in the Island of Palmas Arbitration as follows: 
"Sovereignty in the relation between States 
19. Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 A.J.I.L. 
836 (1960); Lissitzyn, Some Legal Implications of the 
U-2 and RB-47 Incidents 56 A.J.I.L. 135. 
20. Id. p. 844, emphasised. 
21. Id. p. 137, emphasised. 
22. Op. cit., supra, fn 15, p. 10. 
II 22 
12. 
signifies independence. 
to a portion of the globe 
therein, to the exclusion 
functions of a State". 23 
Independence in regard 
is the right to exercise 
of any other State, the 
It follows as a corollary therefore that a State "may 
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
24 
another State". Consequently, when the United States 
decided to send its U-2 aircraft into the Soviet territory 
in 1960, it may be described as attempting to exercise its 
power in the territory of the Soviet Union. But it seems 
stretching the meaning of words to describe the pollution of 
the atmosphere of one State by another as the exercising of 
power or "sovereignty" by one State over the other. Pollution, 
by its nature, normally is not a deliberately planned activity 
1n the sense of "subverting" the integrity of another State. 
In circumstances of hostilities between two neighbouring States, 
it certainly is susceptible of being used as a weapon for 
environmental destruction. But it seems inconceivable that 
a State from which pollutants emanate into another State can 
be aptly described as "sending" those pollutants across the 
border as, say, in the case of sending over a military aircraft. 
But the other limb of territorial sovereignty, namely, 
that a State possess a proprietary right over its territory 
akin to ownership in domestic law offers a firm basis for a 
23. 22 A.J.I.L. at 875 (1928). 
24. The S.S. Lotus, P.C.I.J. Ser. A No. 10 (1927) 7 
2 Hudson, p. 35. 
13. 
State to assert its rights not to be polluted by a neighbouring 
State. The concept of ownership implies the proposition that 
the owner's property be not harmed or damaged by an outsider 
unless there be consent to such harm. 
The basis of a State's claim to non-pollution of its 
environment therefore lies squarely on that State's territorial 
sovereignty in the proprietary sense. However, this is not 
to say that in a State's action against pollution, it 
necessarily follows that actual physical damage must be proved. 
In the domestic Anglo-American law, the tort of trespass does 
not require proof of actual damage but this ingredient is 
. . b d . 25 necessary in an action ase on nuisance. Yet both torts 
are clearly based on proprietary interests. In the Case 
Concerning Nuclear Tests 
26 
(New Zealand v. France), New 
Zealand asserts, inter alia, that the French atmospheric 
nuclear testing 
"(c) ... violates the right of New Zealand that 
no radioactive material enter the territory of 
New Zealand ... including iit~/ air space and 
territorial waters .... 
(d) ... violates the right of New Zealand that 
no radioactive material, having entered the 
territory of New Zealand, ... cause harm 
including apprehension, anxiety and concern to 
the people and Government of New Zealand". (Emphasised) 
It seems both the above claims can be based on violation of 
25. See, for instance, Salmond, Law of Torts, 70 (1969); 
Winfield on Tort, 324, 355 (1967). 
26. Application Instituting Proceedings, 9 May 1973, pp. 14-15. 
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14. 
New Zealand territory in the proprietary sense. 
with respect, the vaguer Australian formula: 
But contrast, 
"(ii) The deposit of radio-active fall-out on the 
territory of Australia and its dispersion in 
Australia's airspace without Australia's consent: 
(a) violates Australian sovereignty over its 
territory; 
(b) impairs Australia's independent right to 
determine what acts shall take place within its 
territory and in particular whether Australia 
and its people shall be exposed to radiation 
from artificial sources;" 26a (emphasised) 
If one were to adopt Lauterpacht's view that "territory 
is both the object of the State's right and the space within 
h . h . t . t d . . d · · · d" 
26b · w ic is sovereign y an Juris iction are exercise , it 
would seem that the Australian claim is based on the second 
rather than the first ingredient of Lauterpacht's formulation. 
Hence, Australia seems to be asserting that some other State 
and not her and her alone, is exercising some rights over her 
territory. But, as argued earlier, it seems inappropriate 
in the case of pollution to say that one State is exercising 
an alleged right over another State when the polluting State 
is in most cases not polluting the injured State as a deliberate 
national policy. Rather, the pollution would seem to have 
occurred as a consequence of a domestic national policy rather 
than a foreign policy. Such a difficulty in semantics as 
well as in law could have been avoided by a claim based on 
territory in the proprietary sense. As it stands, there 
seems to be little difference in the Australian claim (ii) (a) 
and (b) which seems only to clarify what (ii) (a) means. 
26a. Application Instituting Proceedings, 9 May 1973, p. 28. 
26b. See supra, p. 
15. 
(ii) State Responsibility 
The subject of State responsibility is so wide that it 
will be a fruitless pretence to attempt to cover a large part 
of it in a paper of this nature. Rather, we shall only 
traverse some of the more salient features of State responsi-
bility in order to connect it with the subject of pollution. 
Even so, this attempted connection will not pretend to be 
complete. 
In a rather recent report to the ILC, the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr Roberto Ago, proposed four articles on State 
responsibility which may be usefully reproduced for the purposes 
f d
. . 27 
o our 1scuss1on: 
Art. 1: Every internationally wrongful act of a 
State involves the international responsi-
bility of that State. 
Art. 2: An international wrongful act exists when: 
(a) Conduct consisting of an action or 
omission is attributed to the State 
in virtue of international law; and 
(b) That conduct constitutes a failure to 
comply with an international obligation 
of the State. 
Art. 3: Every State is capable of being considered as 
the author of an internationally wrongful act. 
Art. 4: The municipal law of a State cannot be invoked 
to prevent an act of that State from being 
characterised as wrongful in international law. 
A similar formulation is also held by another writer.
28 He 
writes: 
"The elements essential to the establishment of 
international responsibility may be summarised 
27. Third Report on State Responsibility, A/CN.4/246. 
Twenty-third session, 26 April-30 July 1971. 
28. Arechaga, now judge of the Court. 
16. 
as follows: 
(i) An act or omission that violates an obligation 
established by a rule of international law in 
force between the State responsible for the act 
or omission and the State injured thereby. 
(ii) The unlawful act must be imputable to the State 
as a legal person. 
(iii) Loss or damage must have resulted from the 
unlawful act. In inter-State relations, the 
concept of damage does not however have an 
essentially material or patrimonial character. 
Unlawful action against non-material interests 
must receive adequate reparation, even if they 
have not resulted in a pecuniary or material 
loss for the claimant State." 29 
Several points arise out of these two quotations. In 
the first place, both writers are agreed that the violation 
of an obligation established by international law is a 
necessary element for State responsibility: compare Age's 
Art. 2(b) and Arechaga's element (i). In this respect, 
therefore, from the point of view of the international law 
of pollution, it is necessary to establish that an obligation 
exists such as that one State may not pollute the territory 
of another State. 
Indeed, in his report, Ago stresses the importance of 
maintaining a strict distinction between the task of 
determining "the principles which govern the responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful acts" and the task of 
"defining the rules that place obligations on States, the 
' • • b f • b' l' II 
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violation of which may ea source o responsi i ity. 
In short, the proper sphere of State responsibility lies in 
29. Arechaga in Sorensen, Manual of Public International Law, 
534 (1968). 
30. Third Report, para. 6, p. 4, op. cit., supra, fn 27. 
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the first task and not the second which defines the cont
ent 
of an international obligation. The function of the inter-
national law of State responsibility seeks to define the 
legal 
relationship between the State that has been wronged and 
the 
State doing the wrongful act in consequence of the comm
ission 
31 
of that wrongful act. In this respect, another writer has 
been led to comment that "it is usually true that respon
sibility 
in international law results in a remedial process" 
32 
Since, therefore, it is necessary to establish the 
commission (or omission) of an international wrongful ac
t 
before responsibility can attach to a State, this prereq
uisite 
poses a large obstacle in terms of those activities which
 are 
lawful but yet are abnormally dangerous or so-called ultr
a 
hazardous. The attribution of lawfulness to these highly 
33 
risky activities is held by both Ago and Arechaga. In
 
this respect, many writers
34 have sought to establish a new 
basis for a State's responsibility for damage caused by t
hese 
ultra hazardous activities. Ago also informs us that the 
majority of the ILC were of the opinion that State respo
nsibility 
in this field is based on "the entirely different basis o
f the 
so-called responsibility for risk
11
•
35 
31. Id., Chapter I, p. 18 et seq. 
32. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in Internatio
nal 
Law (1928) 183. Cited in Holder & Brennan, International
 
Legal System, 969. 
33. Arechaga, op. cit., 538-540. Ago, op. cit., para. 
5, p. 4. 
34. See for example, L.F.E. Goldie in Proceedings of the
 
Conference of International and Interstate Regulation of 
Water Pollution, Columbia University 1970, p. 21; Jenks,
 
L1ab1lit for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International
 
Law, 117 Hague Recue1l 105 1966 ; Kelsen, State Respon
si-
bII"ity and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 13 Harvard 
International Law Journal, 197 (1972). 
35. Ago, op. cit., para. 5, p. 4. 
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But is it really necessary to look for a new basis of 
responsibility for these types of activity? The primary 
rule for responsibility to attach is that the act or omission 
of a State violates an obligation established by international 
law. If it is established that it is unlawful for one State 
to pollute the territory of another State, does it make any 
difference that the pollution emanates from a highly risky 
operation rather than from a not so highly risky one? For 
example, the pollution may occur as a result of the explosion 
of a nuclear reactor in contrast to the emission of fumes from 
a factory. In both cases, the fact of pollution is present. 
The only difference is that in the one case the violation of 
the law of pollution arises out of an accident while in the 
other case, the violation is a conscious act. But once the 
act of pollution has taken place, thatd:arly breaches the 
obligation not to pollute which at this stage is presumed 
to be established. The fact that the high risk operation 
was conducted lawfully would seem to be immaterial. Responsi-
bility arises out of the breach of an obligation not to pollute. 
The important point, however, is whether there is an obligation 
not to pollute and what are the precise limits of this 
obligation. This point will be discussed in another secti
on. 
In this respect, the concept of State responsibility as pro-
pounded by Ago and Arechaga seems to lose its usefulness as 
the question of whether an act is wrongful has in the first 
place to be established, not by the concept as propounded but 
by a substantive norm of international law. 
A final matter on State responsibility is the question 
of attribution or imputability. Sometimes, a State m
ay not 
be the person actually causing an act which pollutes the 
19. 
territory of another State. This may happen, say, in the 
case of industrial pollution where industries are privately 
owned. But it may be possible to hold a State "responsible" 
in international law for such a polluting act if the impugned 
act can be attributed to the State from which the pollution 
emanates. Both Ago and Arechaga make this clear in their 
respective formulations. Ago's formulation is much clearer 
as he states that this attribution must be given "in virtue 
of international law". 
A good example of how international law attributes the 
act of say, private individuals, to that of a State can be 
35a illustrated by the Corfu Channel case. In this case, 
the Court conceded that on the evidence available, "the 
authors of the minelaying remain unknown" (1949, p. 17). 
Yet it held Albania responsible for the damage caused to 
Britain because Albania has failed to fulfil certain obligations 
incumbent upon her, mainly, her failure to warn the British 
warships of the imminent danger. 
held to be based on: 
These obligations the Court 
"elementary considerations of humanity, even more 
exacting in peace than in war; the principle of 
the freedom of maritime communication; and every 
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States." (1949, p. 22) 
In this case, the authors of the mines could have been 
individuals or a third power, as one commentator has pointed 
out.35b But, nevertheless, Albania was held to be 
35a. See also James (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 
UNRIAA 82, especially 87. 
35b. Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 1, p. 631 
(1957). 
20. 
internationally responsible for the acts of these third parties. 
It is essential to trace the reasoning or mechanics by 
which this attribution comes about. Here, the mines were 
laid in the Corfu Channel in breach of international law. 
But the Court held Albania responsible not because it put 
these mines there. Rather, Albania was held responsible 
because its conduct constituted a failure to comply with 
certain international obligations. These failures led to 
an infringement of the rights of the United Kingdom which 
was entitled to sail innocently through the Channel uninterrupted. 
Applying the above reasoning to the case of pollution, it 
may therefore be equally argued that a State may be held 
responsible for the acts of private individuals within it if 
that State has failed to comply with certain obligations of 
international law. But these obligations need not necessarily 
relate solely to the question of that State actually doing 
the pollution as when it is not necessary to decide that 
Albania has actually laid the mines in the Corfu Channel. 
However, the Corfu Channel case need not be interpreted 
as a case of attribution only. It may be argued that Albania 
was directly responsible because it had failed to comply with 
certain international obligations simpliciter. The act of 
the third parties may have constituted an internationally 
illegal act by itself. But Albania is not responsibile for 
the commission of this illegal act. Rather, it is directly 
responsible because it has failed to warn the British ships 
of the presence of the mines and has knowingly allowed the 
mines to be laid there. 
21. 
In this respect, it may be possible to argue too for a 
direct responsibility of a State for the polluting acts of 
its nationals. Therefore, it is possible that although the 
private individuals in a State are directly causing harm to 
another State by pollution, the first State is responsible in 
international law for this harm because it has omitted to take 
certain steps to prevent the harm caused. Whether such an 
obligation exists in international law is the subject of 
enquiry in our next section. 
(iii) The International Law of Pollution Proper 
Since international law, being law, involves the 
question of rights and duties, we shall proceed to ascertain 
the substance of the international law of pollution on this 
basis. 
In an earlier section (section (i)), we have concluded 
that the rights of a State vis-a-vis pollution emanate from 
the State's ownership of its territory. We have also conclu
ded 
that it is difficult to classify the pollution of one State by 
another as a violation of that State's territory sovereignty 
in the sense that the source State is exercising "its power 
in the territory of another State". However, we have als
o 
made the point that real property in Anglo-American law may 
be "violated" by the torts of trespass and nuisance. 
Following from a discussion of the position in Anglo-
American law, we shall examine the Trail Smelter arbitration, 
discuss certain general principles of international law and 
finally look at international pollution from various 
international agreements. 
22. 
(a) The Anglo-American tort of trespass to air-space 
As stated in our earlier section, trespass requires no 
proof of damage whereas nuisance does. 
It has been said that there is nothing in the authorities 
of English law to justify a conclusion that the passage through 
the air of a vehicle, projectile, or noise, smell etc. at a 
height and in such circumstances so as to involve no inter-
ference with the reasonable use of the subjacent land and 
structures upon it and no contact with them, amounts to the 
36 tort of trespass. In other words, trespass of the air-
space per se would seem not available in English law. Indeed, 
McNair himself, so submits that trespass "does not lie where 
h . . d d . . h. h f d' 1137 t e airspace inva e is wit in t e area o or inary user .... 
If such is the case, then damage to ordinary user would be 
required, relegating the tort of trespass to the same position 
as nuisance. 
However, there are contradictory authorities to this view. 
Winfield and Jolowicz 38 and Clerk and Linsell,
39 
on the 
40 authority of Kelsen v. Imperial Tobacco Co., seem to conclude 
that damage is not essential for trespass to lie in invasions 
of the air-space: 
36. McNair, The Law of the Air (1964) 45. Another writer has 
said: "The state of the authorities is such that it is 
still impossible to say with confidence what the law on 
this point really is": Salmond, Law of Torts 56 (1969). -------
37. McNair, id. 47. 
38. Torts (1971) 312. 
39. Torts (1969) para. 1312, p. 734. 
40. [1957] 2 Q.B. 334. Injunction granted to remove an 
advertising sign which projected some four inches into 
the air-space of the plaintiff's land. 
' -~ 
\J 
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"It is a trespass to invade the air-space above 
land. Whether this is so at any height may be 
doubted, but it is clear that it is a wrong 
where such air-space is necessary for the full 
use of land below." 41. 
Even this formulation may not necessarily catch invasion of 
the air-space by foreign substances such as fumes for it may 
be argued that a slight invasion may not prevent the land 
below from its full use. The principle established in Kelsen's 
case goes contrary to the view originally held by the learned 
Salmond, i.e. that a mere entry into the air-space to be 
actionable must be in the nature of a nuisance. In view 
of the confusion of the previous law, the present editor of 
Salmond on the Law of Torts warns that an appellate court 
could refuse to follow Kelsen's case and adopt Salmond's 
view which was based on equally compelling authorities.
42 
Finally, on this question of the necessity for damage, 
M · 43 k h · h t 1 a 11 ·d cNa1r ma est e point tat we canno exc u ea cons1 er-
ations of public policy and convenience. It is for this 
reason that the principle of reasonable use may be imported 
into a dispute and reasonable use certainly may include 
considerations of damage. 
A further characteristic of the tort of trespass is 
that there must be a "direct infringement
11
•
44 An indirect 
or "consequential" infringement only constitutes a nuisance. 
In terms of application to the facts of a case of pollution 
by fumes etc., it may be difficult to argue that the invasion 
41. Clerk and Lindsell, id. 
42. Page 56. 
43. Id. 4 3. 
44. Clerk and Lindsell, para. 1312· McNair, , 47. 
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is a direct invasion by, say, a factory emitting the offending 
fumes. Rather, the fumes would arise as a consequence of the 
operation of the factory. 
The United States position is that a trespass may be 
committed above the surface of land.
45 But the trespasser 
must intentionally cause a thing to enter land in the 
possession of the other.
46 
not required to be proved. 
Here, it would seem damages are 
Summarising the principles prevailing in Anglo-American 
domestic law, the position appears to be this: In England 
and J S~ Mlk) other parts of the Commonwealth, the question of 
whether it is necessary to prove damages for invasion of an 
47 
air-space of a landowner appears to be doubtful. In 
addition, for the tort of trespass to hold, there must be a 
direct infringement or intentional harm. 
In the international field, dome~tic analogies are seldom 
embraced by the Court "lock, stock and barrel", as it were. 
Rather, the Court looks to them for an indication of a legal 
1
. . . 1 
47a 
po icy or princip e. With respect to the question of the 
need to prove damages in Anglo-American domestic law, it 
seems this point would be of no help to the Court as it is 
not a settled point of law in the domestic context. However, 
45. Restatement, Second, Torts, Art. 159. 
46. Id., Art. 158. 
47. The position in regard to invasion by aircraft is now 
governed by statutory law: Civil Aviation Act, 1949, 
Section 1 (U.K.). 
47a. Brierley, The Law of Nations (6th ed.), p. 63 and p7r 
Lord McNai~ International Status of South-West Africa, 
1950, p. 148. 
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the principle that, for a trespass to hold, there must be a 
direct infringement or intentional harm, seems an attractive 
analogy which the Court may follow. It seems that a State 
cannot complain of a "trespass", as distinct from a "nuisance", 
to its territory if the complaining State cannot show that the 
offending State intended to commit a direct infringement of 
its territory and hence its sovereignty. In the case of 
invasion by a military reconnaissance aircraft, the act is 
both intentional and direct. As such, the Court would seem 
to have no problem in holding that a 'trespass' has been 
committed. But in a case of atmospheric nuclear testing, 
it would seem that the intrusion into another State's 
territory would not have been an intentional act. Rather, 
the intrusion would seem to be only consequential upon the 
explosion of a testing bomb. In such a case, it would seem 
the Court would require proof of a "nuisance" being committed 
rather than a "trespass". 
(b) The Trail Smelter Arbitration
48 
This case has been described by one writer as "the locus 
classicus for liability for extraterritorial damage to 
49 
property". Another writer has said, "The parts of the 
final decision which deal with the questions of res judicata 
and international tort ... deserve to be treated as a leading 
case. 1150 Many current writers on international pollution 
48. 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905-1982 (1941) (hereinafter "the Report"). 
49. A. P. Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 
AJIL 828 at 836. 
SO. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law, 213 at 225. 
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have referred to this case for its now well known proposition, 
but Professor A. P. Rubin
51 
adds more than a caution to 
regarding the case as anywhere near concluding the inter-
national law of pollution. The following comments on the 
case draw heavily upon Professor Rubin's analysis. 
The following questions were submitted to the Tribunal 
from the Compromis 
52 
(1) Whether damage caused by the Trail Smelter in the 
State of Washington has occurred since the first day of 
January 1932, and, if so, what indemnity should be paid 
therefor? 
(2) In the event of the answer to the first part of the 
preceding Question being in the affirmative, whether the Trail 
Smelter should be required to refrain from causing damage in 
the State of Washington in the future and, if so, to what extent? 
(3) In the answer to the preceding Question, what measures 
or regime, if any, should be adopted or maintained by the 
Trail Smelter? 
(4) What indemnity or compensation, if any, should be 
paid on account of any decision or decisions rendered by the 
Tribunal pursuant to the next (sic) two preceding Questions? 
51. Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 
50 Oregon Law Review 259 (1971). 
52. The Report 1908. 
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Under Article IV, the Tribunal was to 
"apply the law and practice followed in dealing 
with cognate questions in the United States of 
America as well as international law and practice, 
and shall give consideration to the desire of the 
high contracting parties to reach a solution just 
to all parties concerned". 
The narrow ratio of the case can be taken as the Tribunal's 
holding that the Dominion of Canada was "responsible in inter-
national law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter". 
53 
But 
the wider ratio of the case is the now celebrated statement 
which should be cited again: 
" ... iQ/nder the principles of international law, 
as well as of the law of the United States, no 
State has the right to use or permit the use of 
its territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
another or the properties of persons therein, 
when the case is of serious consequence and 
the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence." 
Professor Rubin
54 
has commented that "/i/n a sense, it 
was the agreement of the parties as to Canadian liability for 
'damage'" that is the great precedent of the case, not the 
decision of the Tribunal itself. Although it is correct that 
Canada's assumption of liability provides some evidence of 
State practice for this type of inter-state pollution, it 
seems that the case can also be considered as laying down a 
rule of international law supporting this State practice. 
Question 2 of the Compromis directs the Tribunal to consider 
53. The Report 1965. 
54. Op. cit., supra, fn 51. 
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"whether" the Trail Smelter "should" refrain from causing 
further damage. Unlike Question l, the question was not 
"what" indemnity "should" be paid, which only seems to 
involve largely a question of fact rather than of law. 
But to answer Question 2, the Tribunal would seem required 
to refer to some rule of law in order to pronounce whether 
the damage should be allowed to continue. Therefore, it 
seems that the rule stated by the Tribunal in answer to 
Question 2 would be a rule of international law. 
Two main considerations arise out of this case. The 
first concerns the question of why the Tribunal formulates 
the rule in terms of a "serious injury ... established by 
clear and convincing evidence" and what would constitute 
such a "serious injury". The second is whether the "serious 
injury'' includes the violation of territorial sovereignty. 
In assessing the necessity for serious injury, the 
Tribunal started by accepting a formula suggested by 
55 
Professor Eagleton, namely, that 
"A State owes at all times a duty to protect 
other States against injurious acts by 
individuals from within its jurisdiction." 
The Tribunal held that this principle was supported by "a 
great number of ... general pronouncements by leading 
authorities ... " and has been relied upon by several 
II• • • • I 56 international decisions'. What these authorities and 
55. Responsibility of States in International Law 80 (1928). 
The Report at 1963. 
56. The Report 1963. 
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decisions were, the Tribunal did not enumerate upon, except 
to mention the Alabama case. At any rate, it should be 
noted that Professor Eagleton did not qualify his "injurious 
acts". The Tribunal then proceeded to mention that the real 
difficulty often arises "when it comes to determine what, 
pro subjecta materie, is deemed to constitute an injurious 
57 
act". 
To solve this problem, the Tribunal looked towards the 
case law of the United States. 
58 
These cases, except for two, 
were concerned with pollution disputes between the states of 
the United States. From these cases, the Tribunal concluded 
that the element of seriousness or substantial injury was 
necessary before there is breach of an international obligation. 
Was the Tribunal correct in concluding thus for sovereign 
and not mere quasi-sovereign states? b . 59 h. k Ru in tins not, 
mainly because of the "characteristic relationship unique to 
a federal union 11 ,
60 
while Lester is of the view that the 
Tribunal "was probably justifiable to cite Unites States 
Federal authority for the propositions that, where a State 
5 7. Id. 
58. State of Missouri v. State of Illinois 200 US 496; 
Kansas v. Colorado 185 US 125; State of New York v. State 
of New Jersey 265 US 296 and 283 US 473; State of Georgia 
v. Tennessee Copper Co. 206 US 230; State of Georgia v. 
Ducktown Co. 237 US 474. 
59. Op. cit., 269-271. 
60. Id. 270. 
\J 
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is a defendant, an injunction will be issued against it only 
where damage is serious 
II 61 It seems that the cases 
relied upon by the Tribunal were concerned mainly, if not 
solely, with the power of the courts and that Rubin is 
justifiable in his criticism. This is made more evident 
in two recent articles dealing with the United States' inter-
62 
state pollution problems. 
But even accepting Eagleton's original formulation, is 
the mere invasion by fumes or other foreign substances to 
constitute a violation of international law? It is 
submitted that as a matter of policy, the court would require 
proof of substantial harm before it would act. But even 
here difficulties of proof would arise which can only be 
solved by expert evidence. For example, there may well be 
room for argument that the long term genetic effects of 
atmospheric nuclear testing may constitute substantial harm. 
The above problem cou!d, however, be solved if the 
Tribunal had held that the mere entry of fumes into United 
States territory was a violation of territorial sovereignty 
simpliciter and therefore a breach of international law. 
However, owing to the way the Compromis was framed, the 
61. Lester, op. cit., 838. 
62. Note: Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 
Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1972); W. A. Garton, The State versus 
Extra territorial Pollution - States' "Environmental 
Rights" Under Federal Common Law 2 Ecology Law Quarterly 
313 (1972). 
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Tribunal was not afforded this opportunity, or rather, perhaps, 
it felt it judicious to avoid making a decision which may have 
had far-reaching consequences. The United States presumed 
its territorial sovereignty to have been violated, for in 
,'Vl <l.1\t • 
Item (e) of its State11 of Claim, it claims "damages in respect 
of the wrong done the United States in violation of sovereignty
1163 
and itemizes as damages only money expended "for the investig-
ation undertaken by the United States Government of the 
problems created in the United States by the operation of 
, II 64 
the Smelter at Trail . The Tribunal held:
65 
"With respect to (Item e), the Tribunal finds it 
unnecessary to decide whether the facts proven 
did or did not constitute an infringement or 
violation of sovereignty of the United States 
under international law independently of the 
Convention, for the following reason: 
... The Tribunal is of opinion that it was not 
within the intention of the parties, as expressed 
in the words "damage caused by the Trail Smelter" 
in Article III of the Convention, to include such 
moneys expended. . .. Since the United States 
has not specified any other damage based on an 
alleged violation of its sovereignty, the Tribunal 
does not feel that it is incumbent upon it to 
decide whether, in law and in fact, indemnity 
for such damage could have been awarded if 
spec.ifically alleged." 
The first point that arises therefore is that the case 
leaves open the question of whether pollution through the 
atmosphere is a violation of territorial sovereignty absent 
63. The Report 1932. 
64. Id. 1932. 
65. Id. 1932 (Emphasis supplied). 
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a.n agreement. 
Secondly, interpreted naturally, it does not even seem 
that the Tribunal has decided that under the Convention damages 
cannot be obtained for what the United States terms "violation 
of sovereignty" which it presumed existed by Canada's admission 
of liability. The Tribunal seemed to have held only that by 
the terms of the Convention, especially Article III and its 
travaux preparatoires, the parties intended not to allow 
damages for moneys expended for the investigation undertaken 
by the United States. This point seems to be confirmed by 
the latter "final" judgment of the Tribunal when the United 
. . d' . d 66 States asked for a similar sum for a ifferent perio. 
This new claim was again refused on interpretation of the 
Convention. In the passage cited above, the Tribunal seemed 
to have left open the possibility of allowing damages for 
violation of territorial sovereignty if the United States has 
"specified any other damage". Hence, it is quite clear that 
although damages may be claimed for alleged violation of 
sovereignty, according to the Convention as interpreted by 
the Tribunal, these damages must be "translatable into a 
provable cash sum". 
67 
In other words, violation of territorial 
sovereignty per se is not sufficient for the award of damages 
by the Tribunal. But it must be emphasised that this holding 
66. The Report 1959, sub-heading II(b). 
67. To use Rubin's terminology, op. cit., supra, fn 51 at 
265. 
33. 
~!,e.a 
is entirely ,. on the intention of the parties as evidenced 
by the Convention. Hence, it is still very much open for 
argument whether the mere pollution of a State's atmosphere 
per se is a breach of international law because it is a 
violation of territorial sovereignty . As previously argued, 
the writer cannot see the Court decreeing mere entry as a 
violation of territorial sovereignty. Policy considerations 
as well as the indirect and consequential entry would seem to 
militate against such a holding. 
But if the Conv ention is the sole controlling source of 
law for the Tribunal's decision, may this not also subv ert 
the general rule laid down by the Tribunal that no State has 
the right to use or permit the use of its territory so as to 
cause injury by fumes in the territory of another State? The 
answer would, it is submitted, be in the negative. In the 
first place, the Convention itself authorises the Tribunal to 
apply "international law and practice" (Art. IV) . And secondly , 
the general rule was prefaced by the phrase "under the 
principles of international law, as well as the law of the 
United States, II The fact that the law of the United 
States was also invoked cannot destroy the authority of the 
general rule of pollution laid down by the Tribunal. It may 
cast some doub ts on the later part of the rule which requires 
proof of substantial damage as it is quite clear that the 
Tribunal drew heav ily upon the United States case-law to 
obtain this qualification. But in spite of this, it is 
34. 
submitted that the rule laid down by the Tribunal sets the 
foundation for the international law of pollution. 
The whole tenor of Professor Rubin's criticism goes 
towards the Tribunal's holding that the basis of a State's 
responsibility is the causation of "tangible monetary injury" 
68 
In support of this, Professor Rubin said, "Indeed, the tribunal 
explicitly rejected that part of the claim of the United States 
based on Canadian violations of United States sovereignty 
69 
without tangible damage". But, with respect, the writer 
cannot agree that this was not a result of "a close reading 
of the arbitration Compromis ••• 
1170 as indicated above. 
In addition, the United States was not seeking a declaration 
that its sovereignty was violated. What the United States 
wanted was an indemnity for expenses involved in investigating 
and preparing the case. It is doubtful whether it is 
appropriate to subsume such expenses as arising out of a 
violation of sovereignty. 
There appears little doubt in the writer's mind that in 
answering Question l, the Tribunal took upon itself that its 
task was concerned solely with the determination of monetary 
payments. However, Question 2 required a determination of 
the principles of international law and it is in answer to 
6 8 • Op • c it . , 2 7 3 • 
6 9. Id. 
70. Id. 
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this question that the Tribunal proclaimed the general rule of 
international pollution. Although the second part of this 
general rule, i.e. the requirement of seriousness and proof 
by clear and convincing evidence, may have a shaky foundation, 
being based on U.S. case law, still the first part remains 
untarnished. Hence, if we eliminate the second part of the 
rule, we will be reduced to adopting Professor Eagleton's 
formulation, namely, 
"A State owes at all times a duty to protect 
other States against injurious acts by 
individuals from within its jurisdiction." 71 
As a consequence, it would seem that "governments might 
be persuaded to refrain from inferring a right to pollute 
• b • • II 72 
from the rule of the Trail Smelter Ar itration. "Injurious 
acts"certainly need not cover only those acts "translatable 
into a provable cash 
73 
sum". They may include injury to 
. 'ld fl 1 · 
74 
eagles as a species, sparrows, wi owers or sap ings. 
To classify these injurious acts as only those that can be 
measured in monetary terms would seem to run counter to the 
spirit and letter of the Stockholm Conference 1972. 
Difficulties will naturally arise as to proof of acts 
injurious to the environment of a State. But this does not 
71. The Report 1963. 
72. To use Professor Rubin's words again, op. cit., 275. 
73. Rubin, op. cit., 265. 
74. Id., 273. 
36. 
denigrate the general rule laid down by the Trail Smelter 
b ·t t· 75 Ar i ra ion. 
To summarise, the rule as stated by the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration can be put thus: 
"Under international law no State has a right to 
use or permit the use of its territory in such 
a manner as to cause injury by fumes or other 
substances in or to the territory of another." 76 
(c) Other Principles of International Law 
The rule of the Trail Smelter as stated above is not far 
from the principle referred to by the Court in the Corfu 
Channel case: Every state has an obligation "not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States". 1949, p. 22. 
One central principle of international law is the 
principle sic utere tuo est non alienum laedas.
77 But this 
principle is so general that it is of "little use in analyzing 
complex pollution problems 11 •
78 Similarly, the concept of 
• 
neighbourship only explains or amplifies the s~c utere tuo 
. . l 79 princip e. The doctrine of abuse of rights is either 
75. Professor Ehrenfeld, amongst others, suggests a shifting 
of the burden of proof from those seeking to prevent 
innovation to the innovators themselves: "It becomes a 
matter of proof of safety and of long term net benefit, 
rather than a proof of danger." Conference on Water 
Pollution, Columbia University 1970. Proceedings, pp. 7-8. 
76. This formulation is given in Oppenheim, International Law 
(1955) Vol. 1, p. 346, fn 5. The phrase "or other 
substances" is added by the writer for the sake of 
completeness. 
77. Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AJIL 
828 at 830 et seq; Oppenheim, op. cit., 346. 
78. Lester, id. 833. 
79. Id. 
37. 
"tautological or superfluous
11
•
80 The principle of international 
servitudes implies the grant of separate sovereign jurisdictional 
right; it implies a "di vision of sovereignty". 
81 Further, 
its essence lies in the permanence of the servitude.
82 The 
acquisition of such a historic title to the air-space of a 
State would seem repugnant to the basis of territorial 
sovereignty unless a special agreement exists. Furthermore, 
83 
as has been pointed out by Lester, the practice of industrial 
States has been to forbid the acquisition of prescriptive 
pollution rights. Consequently, this practice applies with 
even greater force in the international community. 
A modern ressurection of the sic utere tuo principle is 
the plea for reasonable use of natural resources. Like the 
sic utere tuo principle, this principle will withstand the 
test of time. But unfortunately, it suffers the same weakness 
as the sic utere principle, namely, vagueness. In addition, 
it seems to relegate the rule of law to the rule of reasonable-
ness. No doubt in a conflict situation, the first rule of 
justification is that of the reasonableness of the impugned 
act. But when the act can be classified as being reasonable 
and unreasonable according to one's values, a cry for law is 
80. Id. 834. Arechaga in Sorenson, p. 540: "A state 
substantially affecting other States by emanations from 
within its borders - nuclear tests, fumes, air ... is not 
abusing its own rights, but interfering with the rights 
of another, for it is the integrity and inviolability 
of territory of the injured State that is infringed". 
81. Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 1, "General Works", 
374 (ed. E. Lauterpacht). 
82. Lester, id. 834. 
83. Id. 835. 
38. 
inevitable. 
84 
(d) State Practice and International Agreements 
The willingness of the Canadian Government to pay i
ndemnity 
to the United States of America in the Trail Smelte
r Arbitration 
may be interpreted as evidence of State practice su
pporting the 
rule of liability for extraterritorial damage. In A
rticle I 
of the Arbitration Convention, Canada agreed to pay
 the United 
States the sum of $350,000 to cover all damage whic
h occurred 
prior to January 1, 1932. The work of the Tribunal 
was 
directed, inter alia, to determine indemnity for da
mages (if 
any) occurring after that date. Even here, Canada n
ever 
disputed her liability. Hence, herein is an instanc
e of 
State practice. A much more ambivalent State prac
tice is 
the action taken by the United States in the Fukury
u Maru 
incident of 1954 in the vicinity of the Bikini and 
Eniwetok 
atolls. As a result of the hydrogen bomb tests by
 the United 
States, severe damage was done by nuclear fallout t
o the crew 
of the Japanese fishing vessel Fukuryu Maru, severa
l cargoes 
of fish, and the inhabitants of the Trust territori
es of the 
Bikini and Eniwetok atolls. The legality of the
 harm done 
84. For the plea of reasonableness, see McDougal a
nd Schlei, 
The Hydro~en Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Me
asures 
for Security, 64 Yale Law J. 648; also McDougal, Th
e 
Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of th
e Sea, 
49 AJIL 356 (1955), at p. 361 McDougal says, "What 
is most 
relevant in prior prescriptions from the regime of 
the 
high seas, and can be applied without irrational ex
tra-
polation to this new problem of the hydrogen bomb t
ests, 
is simply the test of reasonableness - the test by 
which 
the decision-makers of the world community have in 
modern 
times adjudicated all controversies involving confl
icts 
between claims to navigation and fishing and other 
claims". 
Emphasis on "reasonableness" is the author's, the o
ther 
emphasis is the writer's. 
39. 
85 
has now been discussed at great length. But a few more 
words may be said from the point of view of State practice. 
After negotiations with the Japanese Government, the United 
States agreed to pay monetary compensation to Japan "ex gratia" 
and "without reference to the question of legal liability
11
•
86 
Unlike the Trail Smelter Arbitration, there was no admission 
of liability here. But clearly, a contradiction exists 
between the words said, as it were, and the payments made. 
If there was no liability, it should necessarily follow that 
there need be no payments. One writer
87 has said that the 
payment reflects the United States' concern and sense of moral 
obligation. 
"Its concern reflects a basic. sentiment of justice 
and stands as an important signpost in the legal 
evaluations of the liability to be ascribed to 
developing scientific activities .•. " 
Looking at the overall effect of the outcome of the settlement, 
it is submitted that the State practice here supports the Trail 
Smelter rule. It affords precedent for the rule that one State 
is liabile to pay compensation for injuries by pollution to 
another State or its nationals. The mere designation of these 
payments as simply ex gratia and without reference to the question 
of legal liability is surely without much legal significance. 
Coming to the field of international agreements, numerous 
such agreements have now been made on control of the pollution 
85. In particular, see Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments 
and International Law, 64 Yale L.J. 629 (1955) and McDougal 
and Schlei, op. cit., supra, fn 84. 
86. [1955] l U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 3160. 
87. L.F.E. Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility 
for Pollution, 9 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
283 at 308 (1970). 
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of the environment. These agreements are centered mainly 
on tackling the pollution problems in particular fields.
88 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these agree-
ments generally. Rather, the writer will concentrate only 
on a few of them to detect any declaration of the law of 
pollution in regard to the atmosphere. 
The obvious starting point is the Stockholm Conference 
on the Human Environment 1972. Principle 21 of the 
Declaration on the Human Environment states clearly the 
responsibility (duty) of States for extraterritorial damage: 
"States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principle of inter-
national law, the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment 
of other States or of areas be ond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. (Emphasised 
The word "responsibility" may create some confusion with 
our earlier discussion of the concept of "State responsibility". 
88. "One sign of the lack of conceptual framework for consider-
ation of international environmental problems is the piece-
meal and overlapping, if not contradictory, classifications 
used in various analyses of environmental problems. Some 
analyses focus on particular pollutants, such as radio-
active materials, oil, or other toxic substances; others 
focus on the medium of transmission, such as rivers, oceans, 
or airspace; others focus on the source of the pollutant. 
In large part, this anecdotal treatment reflects the piece-
meal approach presently being taken by governments, which 
is in turn partly a result of a pattern of dealing with 
environmental problems as an adjunct to other concerns 
or on a post-crisis basis:" S. A. Bleicher, An Overview 
of International Environmental Regulation, 2 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 2 (1972). A convenient list of various 
international "legal response" is collected by Dennis 
Livingston in Black and Falk, The Future of the 
International Legal Order, Vol. 4, p. 97. 
41. 
As explained above, State responsibility only arises on 
commission of a wrongful act as determined by international 
law. 
state. 
It makes the delictual state answerable to the innocent 
But in Principle 21, the word "responsibility" is not 
used in such a context. Rather, it refers to the substantive 
obligation of a State which that State must in the first place 
breach before the machinery of the concept of State responsi-
bility proper can be brought into operation. 
The substantive obligation is the obligation to ensure 
that damage is not caused to the environment of other States 
by activities occurring in the jurisdiction or control of the 
impugned State. It requires no stretch of imagination to 
argue that the duty "to ensure" entails a positive duty. In 
other words, Principle 21 establishes the point that one State 
cannot cause damage to the environment of other States. There 
is no absolute right for one State to pollute the environment 
of other States in spite of a "sovereign right to exploit" 
its own resources.
89 Undoubtedly Principle 22 casts some 
doubts on the present state of the international law of pollution 
but the search for detailed rules cannot detract or derogate 
from the general principle as accepted by the world community.
90 
Speaking in very close terms but with specific reference 
89. In this respect, does not Principle 21 declare the rule as 
determined by the Trail Smelter Arbitration? In spite of 
semantical difficulties that may encounter the word 
"damage", it is submitted that the principle as declared 
is clear in spirit as well as to the letter. 
90. Principle 22 states: "States shall co-operate to develop 
further the international law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
environmental damage caused by activities within the 
jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction." 
42. 
to radioactive debris is the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 1973. 
The parties to this Treaty (including the "Original Parties") 
undertook "to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out" any 
nuclear explosion at any place under "its jurisdiction or 
control: (a) in the atmosphere ••• or (b) in any other 
environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to 
be present outside the territorial limits of the state under 
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted" 
(Art. 1) (Emphasised). The obligation imposed by this Treaty 
on the contracting parties is not to cause radioactive debris 
in "any •.. environment". This would clearly include the 
territories of other States, and not just the territories of 
the contracting States. Here again is a reaffirmation of the 
Trail Smelter rule that a State has no right to pollute the 
environment of other States. The question of the sufficiency 
of damage caused before the rule is breached does not arise 
in this context because on a natural reading of the Treaty, 
the deposit of radioactive debris per se is sufficient to incur 
a breach. Although this Treaty only binds the contracting 
parties, the principle it affirms appears to be clear and 
conclusive. 
A prohibition to pollute the territory of the contracting 
parties by oil is found indirectly embedded in the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 
(amended 1962, 1969) .
91 In this Convention, ships and tankers 
are prohibited from discharging oil in the sea unless certain 
91. 9 I .L.M., p. 1 (1970). 
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conditions are all satisfied.
92 Generally, the Convention 
applies to ships registered in any of the territories of a 
contracting government and to unregistered ships having the 
nationality of a contracting party (Art. II). Various other 
obligations are imposed on the ships as well as on the 
contracting parties, including the commencement of legal 
proceedings by the government of the relevant territory 
against the owner or master of a ship for contravention of 
the provisions of the Convention (Art. X). The contracting 
parties are also required to send to the Bureau (Great Britain) 
and to the appropriate organ of the United Nations 
"the text of laws, decrees, orders and regulations 
in force in its territories which give effect to 
the present Convention." (Art XII (a)). 
The general effect of this Convention therefore is that 
ships are prohibited from polluting the territories of States 
(not only the contracting parties' territories). The fairly 
stringent conditions set out in Art. II ensure a minimum amount 
of pollution, presumably, a harmless amount. The contracting 
parties have an obligation to ensure that these ships comply 
with the provisions laid down for them. In this way, the 
contracting parties indirectly subscribed to the principle that 
92. For 
(i) 
(ii) 
a ship, the necessary conditions are: 
the ship is proceeding en route; 
the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content 
does not exceed 60 litres per mile; 
(iii) the oil content of the discharge is less than 100 
parts per 1,000,000 parts of the mixture; 
(iv) the discharge is made as far as practicable from 
land. 
For a tanker, conditions (i) and (ii) above apply but 
(iii) and (iv) are substituted as follows: 
(iii) the total quantity of oil discharged on a ballast 
voyage does not exceed 1/15,000 of the total cargo• 
carrying capacity; 
(iv) the tanker is more than 50 miles from the nearest land. 
[Articles III ( a) (b) ] 
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ships under their jurisdiction or control do not pollute the 
sea, including the territories of other States. Here again, 
it seems to be an affirmation of the Trail Smelter rule. 
Pollution of the air among industrialised countries is 
not taken as granted, acceptable and without cause for concern. 
In the Declaration of Principles on Air Pollution Control 1968
93 
the Council of Europe declared: 
"Pollution in frontier areas should be the subject 
of joint study by the countries concerned, in 
accordance with a procedure to be laid down". 
[Principle 7] 
Although the declaration does not affirm the principle of 
no right to pollute, it acknowledges that pollution in frontier 
areas requires special attention. 
A further statement on the general rule governing pollution 
of the environment is to be found in the David Davies Memorial 
Institute of International Studies' Draft Rules Concerning 
Changes in the Environment of the Earth 1964.
94 
in this Draft states: 
Section (2) 
"Subject to the provisions of section 3, no State 
or international body shall engage in, or within 
the limits of its authority permit, operations 
which can cause changes in the environment of the 
Earth: 
1. if the range and scale of these changes cannot 
be predicted with reasonable precision; or 
2. if the changes may be reasonably expected 
(a) to have a deleterious effect upon the life, 
health or growth, of human beings or of 
animals or plants; 
(b) to modify the climate or weather of any 
region of the Earth: or 
(c) to prevent, or seriously hinder, scientific 
observation, experiment or research." 
93. Resolution (68) 4. European Yearbook 1968, p. 381. 
94. Appendix X, Jenks, Space Law 430. 
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The provisions of Section (3) deal with consu
ltation 
procedures and do not seem to defeat the gene
ral effect of 
the rule stated, namely, that changes in the e
nvironment of 
the Earth "means changes in the space around 
the Earth, by 
means of the introduction of novel elements o
r the disturbance 
of the physical equilibrium or processes which
 cause reactions 
upon, or in the vicinity of, the Earth" (Sect
ion (1)) and 
hence, includes the territorial air space of 
a State. 
The overview survey of State practice as well
 as the 
limited number of international responses disc
ussed above 
seems to point to the following conclusion: 
that a sovereign 
State has no right to cause injurious or harm
ful effects on 
the territory of another State. When thi
s obligation is 
breached, the polluting State is responsible 
in international 
law according to the rules of State responsib
ility. 
(iv) Ultra Hazardous Activities 
Numerous articles have already been written o
n State 
responsibility for ultra-hazardous activities
.
95 
Ultra-hazardous activities may be defined as 
the carrying 
out or introduction of extremely dangerous bu
t lawful 
95. L.F.E. Goldie, International Principles 
of Responsibility 
for Pollution, 9 Columbia Journal of Transnat
ional Law 283 
(1970); Liability for Damage and the Progres
sive 
Development of International Law, Proceedings
, Columbia 
University Conference on International and In
terstate 
Regulation of Water Pollution 1970, p. 21; C
. W. Jenks, 
Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in I
nternational 
Law, 117 Recueil Des Cours 99 (1966); M.J.L. 
Hardy, 
Nuclear Liability: The General Princi~les of
 Law and 
Further, 36 BYIL 223 (1960); International P
rotection 
~ainst Nuclear Risks, 10 ICLQ 739 (1961); J
.M. Kelson, 
State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dange
rous Activity 
13 Harvard International Law Journal 197 (197
2). 
46 • 
. . t' 96 act1v1 1es. These activities may be described as in
herently 
possessive of a high degree of risk and as such may do da
mage 
even if the best modern scientific safeguards are followe
d in 
carrying out these activities. 
Naturally, the legal position with regard to ultra-
hazardous activities poses some peculiar issues. All these 
issues will not be discussed, rather the writer will only
 
indicate in general terms some of these issues. 
The first problem is whether all ultra-hazardous activit
ies 
~r se and being carried out in a sovereign State can be 
described as lawful activities. The answer to this que
stion 
may be that some ultra-hazardous activities per se could
 be 
illegal when the international community accepts their il
legality. 
Hence, the international community is moving towards outl
awing 
the ultra-hazardous activity of the production and stock
piling 
of chemical and bacteriological weapons as evidenced by 
the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc
tion 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic
 
weapons and on Their Destruction 1971. 
The next problem pertains towards the legal duty of a 
State conducting ultra-hazardous activities. Under
 the 
general rule of international pollution as discussed in 
this 
paper, it is clear that a State has a duty to prevent har
m 
to other States arising out of ultra-hazardous activities
. 
This duty implies taking all possible, strict and scient
ifically 
approved methods of conducting the activity. 
A breach of 
this "preventive" duty with resulting harm entails the 
96. Arechaga in Sorenson, p. 538-539. 
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proposition that the acting State is exercising a right to
 
pollute the territory of another State which right does n
ot 
exist per se. The general rule of pollution as propoun
ded 
in this paper is: 
"Under international law no State has a right to 
use or permit the use of its territory in such 
a manner as to cause injury by fumes or other 
substances in or to the territory of another." 
When a State permits its territory to be used for ultra-
hazardous activities without setting down strict standards
 to 
be adhered to, it is permitting the use of its territory 
to 
be used in such a manner as to cause injury to another St
ate 
if such injury occurs. 
However, the greatest difficulty in this field arises 
when a State has adopted the most up to date and sophistic
ated 
method accepted by the world community to regulate its ul
tra-
hazardous activities. If in such a case, harm is caused
 to 
another State, little would be gained by arguing that the 
standards set are faulty or inadequate. ~_n imperfect 
world 
cannot expect completely perfect standards. In such a c
ase, 
is the State from which the harm originates responsible in
 
international law? At this stage, it seems a certain q
uandry 
is reached. As discussed earlier, State responsibility
 only 
arises out of a wrongful, i.e. unlawful conduct. He
re, if 
the conduct of ultra-hazardous activities is defined as la
wful 
that State cannot be held responsible in international law
. 
A way out of this dilemma is to say that some ultra-
hazardous activities are unlawful per se. But thi
s is 
unhelpful in terms of the difficulties of proving the exis
tence 
of the substantive law. Another way is to say that 
ultra-
48. 
hazardous activities which give rise to harm are il
legal. 
Here, it is the harm caused which makes the activit
y illegal. 
But is there such a rule which supports this sub-ru
le? 
Is harm per se without proof of fault sufficient to
 make a 
State liable for its conduct of ultra-hazardous ac
tivities? 
We have already stated that a State which negligen
tly or 
is at fault in allowing the conduct of ultra-hazard
ous 
activities in its territories with resultant harm i
s liable 
under our general rule of pollution because it is p
ermitting 
its territory to be used in such a manner as to cau
se injury 
to another State. But even if no fault can be pro
ved, it is 
submitted that the mere act of using or permitting 
a territory 
to be used for ultra-hazardous activities clearly i
mplied that 
the acting State is using its territory in such a w
ay (manner) 
that injury may be caused to another State. The i
nherent 
characteristic of ultra-hazardous activities is the
ir 
potentiality for harm. A state which permits or
 uses its 
territory for such potential harm, i.e. harm which 
may occur, 
is permitting its territory to be used in such a m
anner that 
it may cause harm to another State. When the ha
rm actually 
materialises, that acting State may be said to have
 permitted 
its territory to be used in such a manner as to cau
se injury 
to another. In this respect, it is the knowledg
e of the 
potentiality of the harm plus the actual occurrence
 of the 
harm which makes the State responsible under the ge
neral rule 
of pollution. In the light of the Corfu Chann
el case, 
knowledge is essential to attach responsibility. 
But unlike 
the Corfu Channel case, it may be unnecessary to pr
ove "fault" 
in our case, i.e. in the sense that Albania has fai
led in her 
obligation to warn the British warships of the pote
ntial danger. 
49. 
The knowledge in our case refers to the acceptance of 
responsibility of the potential harm that may arise out of the 
conduct of ultra-hazardous activities. In this way, the utmost 
care taken by a State to regulate its ultra-hazardous activities 
cannot absolve that State from its responsibility. 
The above argument thus summarised is: ultra-hazardous 
activities apart from a rule of law making it unlawful per se 
is lawful so long as it is conducted with the best safeguards. 
But if the safeguards are below standard, then State responsi-
bility arises on the causation of harm. Furthermore, State 
responsibility also arises on the causation of harm despite 
adequate standards on the basis that it is unlawful to harm 
the territory of another State when knowledge of such likely 
harm is present. 
Another way to look at this problem is to concede that 
the harm caused by ultra-hazardous activities is caused by 
an innocent, lawful act. The question arises therefore as 
to who should be liable for such a harm, and naturally this 
question requires policy considerations. 
Either on the basis of absolute liability, i.e. liability 
without proof of fault or negligence, or the policy of 
97 
compensation for harm done, various conventions have been 
concluded to make the operators of ultra-hazardous activities 
pay for the damage that may arise out of these activities. 
In the field of nuclear activities, the Vienna Convention 1963, 
the OEEC Convention 1960 and the Nuclear Ships Convention 1962, 
97. In real terms, ex gratia payments in a "glorified" 
legal form. 
50. 
all similarly provide for liability for nuclear damage without 
proof of fault subject to certain exceptions such as force 
Majeure. 
activities. 
Liability is channelled to the operators of these 
The contracting parties must assist in providing 
security which is required of these operators. In the field 
of oil pollution, the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1969 makes the owner of a ship liable for 
any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been 
discharged from the ship (Art. III(l)), but again with certain 
. 98 
exceptions. 
In sum, State responsibility for ultra-hazardous 
activities poses its own peculiar problems which are never-
theless subject to legal analysis. 
Part II 
Judicial Remedies: The Declaratory Judgment and the 
Injunction 
In this part of this paper, we shall discuss the question 
of the standing of a State when it claims against the pollution 
of its territory or of the international environment generally. 
A further section will be devoted to the effect of a declaratory 
judgment and its adequacy as a remedy against pollution. 
Finally, we shall examine the necessity, if any, for an 
injunctive relief and the Court's ability or power to issue 
an injunction. 
98. Art. III(2): "No liability for pollution damage shall 
attach to the owner if he proves that the damage: 
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, 
insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, 
inevitable and irresistable character, or 
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with 
intent to cause damage by a third party, or 
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful 
act of any government ... responsible for the maintenance 
of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of 
that function. " 
51. 
1. The Standing of a State 
It has been said that in nearly all legal systems a 
plaintiff must have a special personal interest in the 
proceedings which he institutes.
1 The content of this 
special personal interest is imprecise and may vary from 
system to system as well as from the types of remedy that a 
2 
plaintiff may request of a Court. But this special personal 
interest, however open-textured, seems to be a prerequisite 
for the commencement of a legal action in Courts. It may be 
generally described as the standing or locus standi of the 
plaintiff. 
In litigation before the World Court too, the presence 
of a locus standi appears to be also a prerequisite for 
litigation. This requirement is highlighted in the case of 
South-West Africa, Second Phase, 1966, p. 6. 
the Court said: 
In this case 
"[T]here was one matter that appertained to the 
merits of the case but which had an antecedent 
character, namely the question of the Applicants' 
standing in the present phase of the proceedings, 
- not, that is to say, of their standing before 
the Court itself, which was the subject of the 
Court's decision in 1962, but the question, as 
a matter of the merits of the case, of their 
legal right or interest regarding the subject-
matter of their claim, as set out in their 
final submissions." p. 18, para. 4. 
Locus standi as seen by the Court in this case is therefore 
a legal right or interest regarding the subject-matter of a 
plaintiff's claim. The actual decision of this case has been 
criticised on a number of grounds and mainly on the ground that 
1. S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(2nd ed.) 423. 
2. Id. 422 et seq. 
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the plaintiffs in this case did have a
 legal right or interest.
2a 
part of the reason for this criticism 
lies in the fact that the 
words "legal right or interest" have n
ot seemed to have been 
defined by the Court and even by publ
icists. Indeed, it is 
doubtful if a satisfactory definition 
of these two words can 
ever be achieved.
3 However, despite the fluidity of the 
locus standi requirement, it is still 
a requirement that must 
be satisfied. 
Although it may not be possible to giv
e a satisfactory 
definition of a "legal right or intere
st", it would seem that 
this formula is a workable, functional
 formula. Different 
fact situations may give rise to diffe
rent considerations as 
to whether a plaintiff has a legal rig
ht or interest. 
But a legal right or interest would no
t seem to be able 
to exist in vacuo. Owing to Hohfeld's
 influence, lawyers 
are prone to think of legal rights or 
interest in terms also 
of legal obligations, that one is the 
converse of the other.
4 
Consequently, a discussion of locus st
andi must also consider 
the position from the point of view of
 obligations. 
2a. See R. Higgins, The International
 Court and South West 
Africa etc., Int'l Comm. of Jurists, p
. 3, especially 
pp. 13-16. 
3. For a complicated jurisprudential
 attempt at defining 
these words, see Stone, Social Dimens
ions of Law and 
Justice (1966) 169-170. At p. 180, S
tone defines "the 
term 'interest' to mean de facto inter
ests, that is, 
demands or claims expressing felt des
ires". But, it 
seems quite clear that demands or clai
ms as such are 
insufficient to establish standing. 
4. For a discussion of the Hohfeldia
n theory, see Stone, 
Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings 
(1964), Ch. 4. 
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In many cases, a State which brings an action before the 
court usually makes the plea that the other State which the 
action is brought against o wes an obligation to the plaintiff 
state and that that obligation has not be fulfilled. Here, 
the locus standi of the plaintiff State is established once 
it is proved that an obligation is owed to her and has not 
wc,cJJ ~ ~ CA<U'.. o-:\- ewt. S\:n,1-~ 
been fulfilled. A good example failing to carry out the 
A 
obligations of a bilateral treaty, say, a trade agreement. 
In this respect, it may be said that the plaintiff State is 
also seeking to protect a legal right or interest given in 
the Treaty. In such a case, the question of locus standi 
is easy to comprehend. A direct relationship exists between 
the two contending States. 
In a pollution situation where one State is responsible 
for polluting the territory of another State, it would also 
seem sufficiently easy for the polluted State to establish a 
locus s tan di. If it is established or accepted that a State 
is under an obligation not to pollute the territory of another 
State as we have argued earlier in this paper, then the legal 
right or interest, i.e. standing of the polluted State, lies 
in the fact that this obligation is owed to the polluted State 
and has been breached by the polluting State. 
But apart from the situation of one State directly 
polluting the territory of another State, the international 
law of pollution may well make it unlawful for a State to 
pollute the environment of the world generally. In this 
(A~ fmP.' "' 
respect, it would seem that the questioWTe/f ' ihltims :.sbandi . may 
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not be susceptible to the straight right or interest and duty 
analysis. Here the obligation is owed, not specifically to a 
particular State which is being polluted, but to all States. 
A dictum in the recent Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
company Ltd case, Second Phase, 1970 seems to suggest that in 
such a situation, any State may have a legal right or interest 
to bring an action against a polluting State. 
reaching dictum is quoted in full as follows: 
This far-
"In particular, an essential distinction should be 
drawn between the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole, and those 
arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all States. In view 
of the importance of the rights involved, all 
States can be held to have a legal interest in 
their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes. (emphasised) 
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary 
international law, from the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights 
of the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of 
the corresponding rights of protection have 
entered into the body of general international 
law (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); others are 
conferred by international instruments of a 
universal or quasi-universal character." 5 
It is clear from this dictum that with obligations owed 
erga omnes, a State has a "legal interest" before the Court. 
In other words, if we accept the original definition of standing 
5. 9 I.L.M. (1970) p. 259. 
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as a legal right or interest regarding the subject-matter of 
a plaintiff's claim, then in the case of obligations owed 
erga omnes, a plaintiff State would seem to have standing 
before the Court even though the interest may not relate 
directly to the plaintiff State as in the case of a litigation 
over breach of a bilateral treaty. However, it is to be noted 
that the standing is established because we have defined it as 
meaning a legal right or interest. In other words, it may be 
sufficient for a State to have a legal interest only. It need 
not also prove a legal right as the two words are used dis-
junctively. 
But such a definition or use of the two words "right" and 
"interest" as shown by the Court in the above dictum seems to 
be different. In the first paragraph, the Court uses the 
words "legal interests" while in the second paragraph, it talks 
of "corresponding rights of protection". As used in this way, 
the Court s eerns to be saying that both ingredients, "a legal 
right" and "a legal interest" are necessary for the establishment 
of standing. Hence, the Court seems to be saying that although 
a State may have a legal interest in obligations erga omnes, it 
must also have a "corresponding right of protection" in order 
that standing may be established. In other words, for a State 
to establish standing in a situation of obligations erga omnes, 
it must first have a legal interest. This is easily satisfied 
as the Court has defined obligations erga omnes as necessarily 
giving this legal interest. But in addition, it ia also 
necessary to prove a "corresponding right of protection". 
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The second necessary ingredient is perhaps better 
illustrated by another dictum from the same judgment. 
paragraph 19 of the same judgment the Court says: 
In 
"However, on the universal level, the instruments 
which embody human rights do not confer on States 
the capacity to protect the victims of infringe-
ment of such rights irrespective of their 
nationality. It is therefore still on the 
regional level that a solution to this problem 
has had to be sought; thus, within the Council 
of Europe, ... the problem of admissibility 
encountered by the claim in the present case 
has been resolved by the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which entitles each state ... " 6 
In this passage, as well as in the second paragraph of 
the previous passage, the Court seems to be saying that for a 
State to have standing before it, it must establish a right 
(or "capacity" now) in an international instrument, except, 
it is submitted, in a case where a State brings an action to 
vindicate a crime of genocide. In such a case, the right 
"have entered into the body of general international law". 
In sum, therefore, the position of standing with respect to 
obligations erga omnes seems to be this: All states have a 
legal interest to protect these obligations, but in order that 
these legal interests may be protected, a plaintiff State must 
also establish a "right of protection". This right of 
protection may be given by "general international law" itself 
or by international instruments. 
6. 9 I.L.M. (1970) p. 272. 
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summarising the question of the standing or locus standi 
of a State with respect to its bringing an action in the Court 
on the ground of pollution, it would seem that the standing of 
a state is firmly established if that State can show that it 
is directly affected by the pollution of another State. The 
obligation owed by the defaulting State in this case is an 
obligation not to pollute the territory of another State. 
once the act of pollution has taken place, the interest of 
the polluting State is directly affected and it has a right 
to bring an action to protect such an interest. 
But where a State is claiming to protect the environment 
not only of its own territory but also of the universal 
environment as a whole, that State has a heavier onus to 
discharge. Firstly, it has to establish that it is unlawful 
to pollute the universal environment. Having done this, its 
legal interest immediately arises as the Barcelona Traction 
case dictum shows. But secondly, it must also show that the 
rule prohibiting pollution of the universal environment gives 
it a right to protect the legal interest. This right may be 
given by general international law as in the case of the crime 
of genocide or it may be conferred by an international instrument.
 
2. The Declaratory Judgment and its Effect 
(i) Judgments generally: the operative provisions. 
Pursuant to Article 79(1) of the Rules of the Court, a judgment 
shall contain, inter alia, "the reasons in point of law; the 
operative provisions of the j udgment". Under Article 59 of 
58. 
the Statute of the Court, the decision of the Court binds the 
bf ·t 10 parties e ore 1 • For members of the United Nations who 
are "automatic" parties to the Statute of the Court (Article 93 (1)
), 
each member further "undertakes to comply with the decision of 
the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is 
a party" 
11 
(Art . 94 ( 1) ) . 
There seems to be a difficulty as to the meaning of a 
"decision" and this difficulty should be resolved if possible 
as it is quite clear that under Article 59 only decisions of 
t h e Court have "binding force" between the parties. It is 
12 
to be noted initially that Simpson and Fox employ the words 
" judgment and award". But as early as 1927, Judge M. Anzilotti 
has this to say in a dissenting judgment:
13 
"To say that the request for an interpretation can 
only relate to the binding part of the judgment 
is equivalent to saying that it can only relate 
10. "That a judgment or award duly pronounced by a tribunal is 
binding upon the parties is inherent in the judicial process, 
whether in international or municipal.... Nevertheless it 
has been usual, through the modern history of international 
judicial settlement, to provide expressly that the judgment 
or award shall be final and binding upon the parties": 
Simpson and Fox, International Arbitration 228 (1959). 
11. Hence it seems a member, being a party to a case before the 
Court, who does not comply with its decision, is in v iolation 
of th~ee obligations, the obligation to comply with the 
inherent binding effect of the decision, the obligation 
under Art. 59 of the Statute and the obligation under 
Art. 94(1) of the Charter. 
12. Supra, fn 10. 
13. Judgment No. 11 (Interpretation) Series A, No. 13, p. 4 
at 23-24 (Chorzow Factory); the writer quotes from 
1 Hudson, 638. 
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to the meaning and scope of the operative part 
thereof, as it is certain that the binding effect 
attaches only to the operative part of the judgment 
and not to the statement of reasons. 
The grounds of a judgment are simply logical arguments, 
the aim of which is to lead up to the formulation of 
what the law is in the case in question.... When 
I say that only the terms of a judgment are binding, 
I do not mean that only what is actually written in 
the operative part constitutes the Court's decision. 
On the contrary, it is certain that it is almost 
always necessary to refer to the statement of 
reasons to understand clearly the operative part 
But, at all events, it is the operative part which 
contains the Court's binding decision .... " (emphasised) 
Although one might argue that the first sentence of the 
third paragraph imports that the binding part of a judgment 
may be found elsewhere than in the written words of the 
operative part, it is quite clear that the learned judge is 
stating that only the operative part of a judgment binds. 
R h h h d 
. 1 h . . 14 
osenne, on t e ot er an, seems non-committa on t is point: 
"It will be noted that, unlike Articles 56, 57, 58 
60 and 61, which use the word 'judgment' (a~r~t), 
Article 59 uses the word 'decision'. The 
assumption is that this normally refers to the 
operative clause of the judgment (cf. p. 603 
above) . " 
At p. 603 he states: 
"In the Interhandel case the Court defined the 
expression 'to implement a decision' as meaning 
'to apply its operative part'. 1959, p. 28. 
In the I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal (UNESCO) 
case the Court again confirmed that a tribunal's 
'decision' is the operative part of its judgment 
on a given point, and not the grounds of decision 
invoked by that tribunal. 1956, at p. 8 .... " 
14. The Law and Practice ... (1965) p. 619. 
60. 
15 
Hudson appears clearer in his formulation: 
" ... a judgment on the merits is a 'decision' under 
Article 59 of the Statute, and it therefore has 
binding force.... Each of the Court's judgments 
concludes with an operative part (Fr., lB dispositif) 
in which the Court's action or decision is embodied, 
and the 'reasons' serve as aids in the interpretation 
of what is contained in the operative part." 16 
The import of the above authorities seems to be this: 
the operative part of a judgment is binding. But the reasons 
given for the operative part are not binding but may serve as 
aids in the interpretation of the operative part. And finally, 
the operative part of a judgment seems to be the same as the 
'decision' of a judgment as that word is used in Article 59 
of the Statute: 
One apparent difficulty which must be mentioned is the 
wording of Article 94(2) of the Charter~ 
"If any party to a case fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment 
rendered by the Court, the other party may ... " 
(emphasised) 
In Article 94(1) of the Charter the word used was 'decision' 
but an immediate change of word is used in 94(2) - 'judgment'. 
15. The Permanent Court of International Justice (1934) at 419. 
16. Cf. the same writer also in The Permanent Court of 
International Justice 1920-1942 (1943) at 587: "The 
judgment consists of several parts, ... and lastly the 
operative provisions. The 'reasons' given in the 
judgment have not the 'binding force' of the operative 
part." See also Keith, The Extent of the Advisory 
Jurisdiction etc. p. 29. 
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It is therefore necessary to determine whether the obligations 
incumbent upon a party arise out of the judgment or the operative 
part of the judgment which is the only part that seems to be 
binding. 
It seems the word 'judgment' in Article 94(2) is synonymous 
with 'decision' in Article 94(1). Although the drafters of 
the Charter may have intended to c.o,w€.y a different 
meaning by using a different word, it is the operative part 
of a judgment, i.e. decision, that sets out the obligations 
incumbent upon the parties before the Court. There seems to 
be no other part of a judgment that contains binding obligations 
vis-a-vis the parties. But as Judge Anzilloti and Hudson 
point out, the reasons in a judgment may serve as aids in the 
interpretation of the operative part. 
This point can be illustrated by the case of the Legal 
17 
Status of Eastern Greenland, Series A/B, No. 53, p. 22. 
Having discussed in detail the various aspects of the £hlern 
18 
declaration, the Court states in the judgment at p. 73: 
"It follows that, as the result of the undertaking 
involved in the lhlern declaration of July 22nd, 
1919, Norway is under an obligation to refrain 
from contesting Danish sovereignty over Greenland 
as a whole, and a fortiori to refrain from 
occupying a part of Greenland." 
17. 3 Hudson 151. 
18. Id. 194. 
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In the operative part of the judgment, the Court held, 
inter alia: 
"(i) decides that the declaration of occupation 
promulgated by the Norwegian Government on July 
10th, 1931, and any steps taken in this respect 
by that Government, constitute a violation of 
the existing legal situation and are accordingly 
unlawful and invalid." (p. 75) 19 
In this respect, any doubt as to the precise obligations 
incumbent upon Norway may be clarified by referring to the 
reasons given in the judgment and one of these is that Norway 
is to refrain from occupying a part of Greenland. In this 
case, the Court may be said to be declaring merely the rights 
and obligations of the parties before it. But can the Court 
do more than this and is it necessary to do more? This 
question is examined in the next two sections. 
(ii) Declaratory judqments: definition of and difference 
from "coercive" judgments. At the outset, the point should be 
made that the operative provisions of a judgment are dependent 
to some extent upon the final submissions of the contending 
. 20 . 
parties. Apart from the case of a special agreement, 
19. Id. 195. 
20. 2 Rosenne (1965) 601. See also Rosenne, The World Court 
and what it is etc. (1962) at 113: "When a case is 
introduced by application, the decision of the Court is 
given on the final submissions, but when it is introduced 
by special agreement that ... defines what it is that the 
Court has to decide .... " "Final submissions" means 
"the ultimate concretization of the difference between 
the parties:# Rosenne (1965) p. 585. 
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generally two broad types of formulae are used to frame the 
operative provisions. When the final submissions correspond 
accurately with the subject-matter of the dispute, the operative 
provisions of the judgment will be formulated in terms of the 
submission which is upheld. When the submissions do not so 
correspond, the operative provisions will be worded as nearly 
as possible to that submitted by the party whose claim is 
21 
being upheld. 
But apart from the question of the interdependence of the 
final submissions and the operative provisions of a judgment, 
there is the further question of the exact language by which 
the Court may formulate its operative provisions. Conversely, 
the question may also be examined from the side of the final 
submissions, i.e. whether they should be framed with any 
21. Rosenne, vol. 2 (1965) at p. 601 cites the Fisheries case 
as being an example of the first formula. But even here, 
the Court went much further than the final submission of 
Norway. The final submission of Norway as recognised by 
the Court asked the Court "to adjudge and declare that the 
delimitation of the fisheries zone fixed by the Norwegian 
Royal Decree of July 12th, 1935, is not contrary to inter-
national law". 1951, p. 124. The Court "Finds" in the 
operative provisions by ten votes to two "that the method 
employed for ... /herein it follows the exact terms of the 
above submission/" But the Court also voted (8-4) "that 
the base-lines fixed by the said Decree in application 
of this method are not contrary to international law". 
1951, p. 143. It seems therefore that the Court may 
not only uphold the final submissions of a party but 
may also add to that final submission a finding which 
is not submitted as final, but which may necessarily 
follow from the final submission. Or, perhaps the 
Court in this instance is rejecting the British 
submission in a positive manner. See 1951, p. 140 
et seq. 
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appropriate words. 
Hudson has consistently stated: 
"The terms of the operative part (le dispositif) 
are always carefully chosen. It is usually a 
declaration as to the legal obligations of the 
parties, a 'formulation of what the law is in 
the case in question', rather than a command 
addressed to the parties; In most cases, 
the Court does not direct the parties to act or 
to refrain from acting; instead it declares 
what they are by law bound to do or to refrain 
from doing, or pronounces upon submissions which 
have been presented. The Court has power 
to give a declaratory judgment properly so-called." 22 
In essence, therefore, the Court's decision will not be 
framed with coercive words, i.e. directing the parties to act 
or to refrain from acting. We have already seen two examples 
of this type of decision, viz. in the Fisheries case and the 
23 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case discussed above. But 
the Court has also given judgments which seem to have a coercive 
character. In the SS. Wimbledon case, the Court held, inter 
alia, "5. that the German Government shall therefore pay to the 
Government of the French Republic ... " Ser. A, No. 1, p. 33. 
Read naturally, this operative clause is a direction ordering 
22. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-
1924 (1943) pp. 587-8. See also by the same author, The 
Permanent Court of International Justice (1934) p. 420; 
International Tribunals, Past and Future (1944) p. 120. 
When a case is submitted by a special agreement, it seems 
there is less difficulty for the Court in formulating the 
operative provisions: see Hudson, id., also Rosenne 
( 196 5 ) p . 6 0 1. 
23. A fine collection of "purely declaratory" judgments is 
found in Vallat, Declaratory Judgments Current Legal 
Problems (1964) p. 1 at fn 11 and fn 15. 
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the German Government to pay. 
24 
But Vallat doubts that this 
is so as it only stated what the German Government "shall do" 
and did not order the German Government to make payment. 
25 
Hudson also doubts that this clause is in a coercive form, 
basing his argument on the controlling French version of the 
judgment and the improper translation of "sera tenu", in 
English as "shall pay". In view of these criticisms, this 
case offers weak support to the proposition that the Court 
may issue a coercive decision. 
A more forthright stand is taken by the Court in the case 
of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Ge.x. 
Ser. A/B No. 46, p. 96. The Court decided, inter alia, in 
this case "That the French Government must withdraw its customs 
line in accordance with ... " and that the withdrawal be effected 
by a certain date (p. 172). This case therefore offers a 
persuasive illustration of the power of the Court to direct 
a party to do certain acts. But it is marred by the fact 
that the case was presented by Special Agreement and as such 
gives the Court greater flexibility to read into the common 
will of the parties. Furthermore, the Court was probably 
influenced by the Swiss offer of a partial compromise in the 
course of the oral proceedings (seep~. 169-172). 
The Chorzow Factory case (indemnity) Ser. A, No. 17, p. 4, 
affords some support for the possibility of a coercive operative 
24. Id. 7. 
25. The Permanent Court etc. (1934) p. 421 and fn 64. 
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clause. Having found the Polish Government under an obligation 
to pay compensation to the German Government, the Court, inter 
alia, "(7) gives judgment to the effect that the compensation 
to be paid by the Polish Government to the German Government 
shall be fixed as a lump sum;" p. 64. The Court, it may be 
argued, did not actually direct or order in "strong language" 
that Poland should pay compensation to Germany but it appears 
that the direction as to the method of payment is coercive in 
form, i.e. that Poland was directed to make a lump sum payment. 
Another case dealing with compensation, the Corfu Channel case, 
1949, p. 244 (compensation) offers little support to the 
proposition that the Court may use more direct language when 
ordering a losing party to pay compensation. In this case, 
the Court merely "gives judgment" in favour of the United 
Kingdom and "fixes the amount of compensation due from the 
People's Republic of Albania to the United Kingdom at £843,947". 
p. 250. Here the operative clause is clearly neutral in force. 
In fact, the clause could easily be described as being polite. 
Having examined four choices of words in the operative 
clause employed by the Court in the above four judgments, we 
shall now attempt a definition of the meaning of "declaratory 
judgment" and assess whether such a concept is of a functional 
use in actions in the Court. 
Vallat
26 
defines a declaratory judgment as "a declaration 
26. Declaratory Judgments, Current Legal Problems (1964) 
p. 1 at 2-3. 
6 7. 
by a court as to the legal rights or obligations of one or more 
parties to a suit without an order for specific relief .... 
The real distinction is between a judgment which is a mere 
declaration and one which includes an executory order. By 
an executory order is meant one which calls on a party to the 
litigation to do or to refrain from doing some act. A 
declaratory judgment states the rights and obligations of the 
parties without calling on any of them to do so or refrain 
from doing any act". The essence of a declaratory judgment 
therefore is that it does not call upon a party to do or 
refrain from doing some act. 
27 
There is no "command" 
"coercive" decree
28 
addressed to the parties. 
or 
The difficulty with this definition is that it is so much 
d d f h . d 28a epen ent upon a mere care ul c oice of wor s. For instance, 
in the S.S. Wimbledon case (supra) the Court could have reframed 
the operative clause to read, "that the German Government is 
under an obligation to pay " instead of "shall pay" or in 
the Free Zones case, "that the French Government is under an 
27. See Hudson, supra, fn 22. 
28. E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1941) p. 25 et seq. 
28a. E. M. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in International Law, 
29 A.J .I.L. 488 (1935). At p. 489, "In one sense it may 
be said that every decision of an international tribunal 
results in a judgment merely declaring the rights of the 
parties without coercive decree.... In theory, however, 
a judgment that A is under a duty to B to pay money or 
deliver property is regarded by some as not strictly 
declaratory. This is a matter of definition .... " 
68. 
immediate obligation to withdraw its customs line ... " instead 
of "must withdraw". In effect, this use of more polite words 
seems prevalent in the Court's practice. In the Temple of Preah 
Vihear case, 1962, p. 6, the Court 
and 
"finds in consequence ... that Thailand is under an 
obligation to withdraw any military or police forces 
... stationed by her at the Temple, or in the 
vicinity on Cambodian territory" 
"that Thailand is under an obligation to restore 
to Cambodia any objects of the kind specified 
in Cambodia's fifth submission which may 
have been removed from the Temple ... by the 
Thai authorities." 29 
The Cambodian final submission with respect to the return of 
the religious chattels records, inter alia, "5. To adjudge 
and declare that the scriptures ... are to be returned to ..• 
Cambodia". p. 11. 
30 In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case the 
operative clause may be described as purely declaratory in 
29. The Chorzow Factory case, "(l) ... the Polish Government 
is under an obligation to pay .... " Ser. A, No. 17 at 63. 
The Ambatielos case, "finds that the United Kingdom is 
under an obligation to submit to arbitration ... the 
Ambatietos claim" 1953, p. 23. The Arbitral Award Made 
by the King of Spain case, "finds that the Award made by 
the King of Spain is valid and binding and that Nicaragua 
is under an obligation to give effect to it" 1960, p. 217. 
But cf. Peter Pazmany University case, Ser. A/ B, No. 16 
(Judgment) at p. 249, inter alia, ~b) that the Czechoslovak 
Government is bound to restore to the Royal Hungarian 
Peter Pazmany University of Budapest the immovable property 
claimed by it, " (emphasised). 
30. Supra, fn 19. 
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contrast to the Temple of Preah Vihear case. But may it not 
be argued that in both cases, the obligations incumbent on both 
Norway and Thailand were the same, namely, to refrain from any 
acts which seek to claim sovereignty over the disputed 
territory. The answer seems clearly to be in the positive.
31 
The conclusion therefore seems to be that the question 
whether the Court would issue a coercive or executory operative 
provision depends on a mere question of choice of words and in 
most cases the Court would choose words that are non-coercive 
or non-offensive to the defaulting litigant. 
Besides the question of the Court refusing to "command" 
a party to do or refrain from doing certain acts by direct 
words, it seems that in order for the Court to place a specific 
obligation upon a party, that specific obligation must be 
explicitly pleaded by the party requesting it in order to 
avoid difficulties of interpretation that may arise as a 
result of not so pleading. 
The normal course of action to obtain an "executory" 
decision
31
aof the Court is to allege the existence of a right 
or obligation owed to a State, the violation of that act and 
the remedying of that violation. It is only in the request 
31. This point is developed further, see infra, p.ry~ 
31a. I.e. that the defaulting party be obliged to do or refrain 
from doing certain acts whether by direct words or indirect 
'polite' words. 
70. 
for a remedy that the question of "executory" decision arises. 
Hence, in the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory case, 1960, 
p. 6, the skilful pleading by Portugal assisted the Court to 
consider th~e.R.. concretised questionS, (1) the existence in 1954 
of a right of passage in Portugal's favour, (2) failure by 
India in 1954 to fulfil its obligation in regard to that right 
of passage, and (3) in the finding of such a failure, the remedy 
for the resulting unlawful situation (seep. 36).
32 
But difficulties were encountered in the Asylum case, 
1950, p. 266, which only asked for a "purely" declaratory action 
without specific requests for a remedy. The Court in this case 
found the grant of asylum by the Colombian Government to Hay a 
de la Torre was, inter alia, not made in conformity with 
Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Havana Convention. After the 
judgment was delivered (November 20, 1950), a question arose 
as to whether Colombia was bound to deliver Mr Haya de la Torre 
to the Peruvian authorities. It took two further judgments 
of the Court to resolve this question.
33 
(iii) Declaratory judgments: their legal effect. But 
is it really necessary to ask for specific remedies at all? 
32. The writer is reading 31 I.L.R. p. 49. 
33. Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 
November 1950 in the Asylum case, 1950, p. 395; 
Hayra de la Torre, 1951, p. 71. 
71. 
The grant of specific remedies arises only on breach of the 
obligations incumbent upon a State. Can this breach 
necessarily entail certain consequences? 
The Hayra de la Torre case, 1951, p. 71 (the second 
sequence to the Asylum case) illustrates that this question 
depends on the substantive law that is breached. Hence, 
Colombia is found not bound to deliver Mr Hayra de la Torre 
to the Peruvian authorities because "the Havana Convention 
does not ... impose a duty upon!~/ State to surrender the 
person to whom asylum has been {irregularli/ granted". p. 81. 
However, the same case also affirms the principle that 
the breach of an international obligation by one State entails 
the cessation of that breach by the offending State. The 
Court states: 
"In its judgment of November 20th, the Court held 
that the grant of asylum by the Government of 
Colombia to Hay a de la Torre was not made in 
conformity with Article 2, paragraph 2. of the 
Convention. This decision entails a legal 
consequence, namely that of putting an end to 
an illegal situation: the government of Colombia 
which has granted the asylum irregularly is bound 
to terminate it. As the asylum is still being 
maintained, the Government of Peru is legally 
entitled to claim that it should cease." (p. 82 
emphasised) 
The first underlined sentence was expressly adopted by 
34 the Court in the advisory opinion of the Namibia case. 
34. 10 I.L.M. 677 at 712, para. 117. 
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The Court, having invoked the above principle, states: 
"South Africa, being responsible for having created 
and maintained a situation which the Court has 
found to have been validly declared illegal, has 
the obligation to put an end to it." 35 
On the basis of this principle, it seems a specific request 
by a party for the cessation of an illegal act which has been 
declared by the Court to be illegal appears superfluous. 
Although it seems crystal clear that the commission of an 
illegal act must cease, many treaties of arbitration seem to 
have a provision contrary to this principle. Hence, it is 
quite common to find a provision of the following nature: 
"If in a judicial sentence or arbitral award, it 
is declared that a judgment or a measure enjoined 
by a court of law or other authority of one of the 
parties to the dispute, is wholly or in part 
contrary to international law, and if the 
constitutional law of that party does not permit 
or only partially permits the consequences of 
the judgment or measure in question to be annulled 
the parties agree that the judicial sentence or 
arbitral award shall grant the injured party 
equitable satisfaction ior shall specify the nature 
and extent of the reparation to be granted to the 
injured part¥/ 35a 
It is submitted that such a provision does not detract 
from the principle that the commission of an illegal act must 
cease as it is related specifically to the constitutional law 
of the contracting parties. It is doubtful if the Court 
35. Id. para. 118. 
35a. See UN Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, 1928-1948, 
p. 291. 
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exercising its powers under the Statute would take into account 
the specific constitutional limitation of a party before it. 
In fact, such a suggestion would be contrary to the primacy 
of international law as it is conceivable that many States 
would then be able to rid themselves of international obligations 
by merely amending their constitutional law in such a way that 
all their international actions could not be annulled. In 
this way, a rich State may be able to commit a continuing 
breach of an international obligation and yet be allowed to 
continue that breach so long as it is able to, say, pay 
monetary reparation to the injured State. A decision by 
the Court of such a nature would seem to be unacceptable 
unless specially agreed to by the parties before it. 
A further comment on the above-cited provision is that it 
only refers to the annulment of the consequences of an illegal 
act. As such, nothing is said as to whether the illegal act 
itself should be allowed to continue. A difference certainly 
exists between the commission or continuation of an illegal act 
and the consequences that may arise out of the commission of 
the illegal act. One of the consequences of an illegal act 
is that a State responsible for it has a duty to make reparation 
so as to wipe out as far as possible its detrimental effect. 
This question of reparation will be discussed later in this 
paper. But an illegal act in the nature of an administrative 
decision taken ultra vires may attach as a consequence to the 
. 1 · 35b sanction of nul ity. So, for instance, the Court in its 
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advisory opinion on the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO gave 
its opinion that the Safety Committee was not constituted in 
accordance with the Convention for the establishment of the 
. . 35c 
organisation. The question faced by the United Nations 
35d 
after the giving of this opinion was a difficult one. But 
one point is clear, and that is that the advisory opinion 
gave no room for doubt that the illegally constituted safety 
committee cannot continue to exist without some measures taken 
by the UN to rectify the illegality. Hence, this case affords 
further support to the principle that an illegal act cannot 
be allowed to continue. A further result of an illegal act 
may be that some consequences of a perfunctory nature may not 
attach the sanction of nullity. So, for instance, the Court 
in the Namibia case stated that the effect of the illegal 
exercise of the Mandate by South Africa cannot be taken to 
invalidate the registration of births, deaths and marriages 
. 35e 
as instances. Again, this point does not detract or 
qualify the principle that an illegal act should not be allowed 
35b. The subject of nullity is too wide to come within the 
scope of this paper. For an introduction to it, see 
R. Y. Jennings, Nullity and Effectiveness in International 
Law and E. Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts 
of International Organisations in Cambridge Essays in 
International Law: Essays in honour of Lord McNair (1965) 
pp. 64 and 88. 
35c. I.C.J. Rep. 1960, p. 150 
35d. See E. Lauterpacht, supra, pp. 100-106. 
35e. 10 I.L.M. 677 (1971), para. 125 of the Judgment. 
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to continue. The whole thrust of this advisory opinion is 
that South Africa must put an end to its administration of 
Namibia. 
In sum, therefore, it is quite clear that although an 
illegal act may have consequences which international law may 
have to give recognition to, international law itself does 
not sanction the view that an illegal act should be allowed 
to continue. Once an act is held to be illegal, the over-
riding principle that it must cease takes effect. 
In this respect, it may be queried whether the fourth and 
· · b d. 36 . 1 f . h fifth submissions of Carn o ia in the Tempe o Preah Vi ear 
case are superfluous. Since the Court found that the Temple 
of Preah Vihear was situated in Cambodian territory, it seems 
to follow that the force of this mere declaration of sovereignty 
would require Thailand to withdraw its military forces. 
Similarly, the religious scriptures having been declared to 
37 
belong to Cambodia, Thailand would be obliged to return them. 
The Court itself described both claims as "implicit in, and 
consequential on, the claim of sovereignty itself" (p. 36). 
As regards the fourth submission, it may be argued that this 
submission is necessary because the nature of the dispute being 
36. 1962, p. 6 at p. 11, 11 4. To adjudge and declare that ... 
Thailand is under an obligation to withdraw the detachment 
of armed forces .... 5. To adjudge and declare that the 
scriptures be returned to Cambodia .... " 
37. See, however, as to the fifth submission, the joint 
dissent of Judge Tanaka and Judge Morelli at p. 37. 
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one of claim of territorial sovereignty, ex hypothesi, it 
cannot be alleged by Cambodia that Thailand was violating 
its territorial sovereignty. As such, the Court was precluded 
from finding that Thailand was committing an illegal act and 
consequently be required to cease that illegal action by the 
sheer force of the finding of illegality. But this argument 
cannot be sustained as Cambodia did allega a violation of its 
territorial sovereignty,
38 
although it did not include this as 
part of its final submissions. On all counts, it seems to be 
implied from the Court's judgment that Thailand has violated 
Cambodian territory because the mere declaration of Cambodian 
sovereignty over the area of the Temple cannot logically entail 
the obligatory withdrawal of Thai military forces unless they 
were in the first place violating Cambodian territory. The 
question to be asked is why the Cambodian Government did not 
feel it necessary to allege the illegality of the Thai action. 
It seems that the answer may be that Cambodia was much 
concerned with the stationing of the Thai military forces on 
the Temple premises and was anxious to see them withdrawn.
39 
38. I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, vol. 1, p. 4. 
39. The first paragraph of the Cambodian application refers 
immediately to the detachment of the Thai forces. In 
the same application, Cambodia submitted firstly, that 
the Thai military forces be withdrawn and only secondly, 
that the territorial sovereignty of the Temple belongs 
to Cambodia. I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, 
Vol. 1, pp. 4 and 15. 
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Had Cambodia explicitly pleaded the violation of its territorial 
sovereignty without a further request for an "executory" decision, 
it would seem that Thailand would equally be under an obligation 
40 
to withdraw its troops. The Court seemingly did not even 
discuss the fourth submission of Cambodia.
41 
(iv) Declaratory judgments: damages and question of 
jurisdiction. Although it may be unnecessary to ask for an 
11 executory 11 decision of the Court obliging a party to cease 
the carrying on of an illegal act, in many instances, the 
parties may not be satisfied with obtaining only a mere 
d . f h ·1 . 
42 
eclarat1on o t e 1 legality of an act. Such instances 
usually involve the successful State requesting the payment of 
43 
damages. We have seen that a specific remedy may not 
40. Cf. the submission of Denmark in the Legal Status of Eastern 
Greenland case, Ser. A/B, No. 53, p. 22 at 25 which asks 
for a 'mere' declaration of "violation of the existing 
legal situation". See also Jenks, The Prospects of 
International Adjudication at p. 419, "International courts 
and tribunals may ... grant the equivalent of a prohibitory 
or mandatory injunction. Thus, a finding of sovereignty 
in respect of territory is in effect a prohibitory 
injunction addressed to the unsuccessful party." 
41. See p. 36. 
42. But cf. The Corfu Channel case (merits) 1949, p. 4. At 
p. 36: "The Court ... unanimously i2/ives judgment by 
reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters 
.•. the United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the 
People's Republic of Albania, and that this declaration 
by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate satisfaction." 
Albania requested such a declaration only, p. 35. 
43. See generally, Whiteman, Damages in International Law 
(1936) 3 volumes. 
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automatically flow from the commission of an illegal act. 
The substantive obligation breached must itself provide for 
the specific remedy although the illegal act itself must cease 
to continue. Hayra de la Torre case, 1951, p. 71. 
But it is generally accepted as a principle of international 
law that reparation for a wrongful act follows as a matter of 
course on the commission of the wrongful act so long as it can 
be shown that injury has occurred. The basis of this rule is 
found embedded in several dicta of the protracted litigation 
over the Chorzow Factory case. 
In the 1927 Judgment on jurisdiction, Ser. A, No. 9 at 
p. 21, the Court stated: 
"It is a principle of international law that the 
breach of an engagement involves an obligation 
to make reparation in an adequate form .... " 
Further, in a subsequent 1928 Judgment (indemnity), Ser. A, 
No. 17 at p. 29, the Court reiterated: 
"It is a principle of international law, and even 
a general concept of law, that any breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparation ... " 
and at p. 27, reparation 1.s the "corollary of the violation of 
the obligations resulting from an engagement between States". 
The question of what constitutes reparation seems best 
expressed by the Court also: 
"The essential principle contained in the actual 
notion of an illegal act - a principle which s _ems 
to be established by international practice and in 
particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals -
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is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if 
this is not possible, payment of a sum corres-
ponding to the value which a restitution in kind 
would bear; the award, if need be, of damages 
for loss sustained which would not be covered by 
restitution in kind or payment in place of it -
such as the principles which should serve to 
determine the amount of compensation due for an 
act contrary to international law." 
(Ser. A, No. 17, p. 47.) 
In the course of setting out the above rules, the Court 
also referred to the question whether it is necessary to 
establish the jurisdiction of the Court when a request for 
reparation is made. In this respect, the Court seems to take 
the view that jurisdiction for reparation follows as a matter 
of course when an illegal act has been committed. Hence, it 
said: 
''Reparation therefore is the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply a convention 
and there is no necessity for this to be stated 
in the convention itself." 
(Judgment No. 8 (Jurisdiction) Ser. A, No. 9, 
p. 21) 
And further, 
"In Judgment No. 8, when deciding on the juris-
diction derived by it from Article 23 of the 
Geneva Convention, the Court has already said 
that reparation is the indispensable complement 
of a failure to apply a convention, and there is 
no necessity for this to be stated in the convention 
itself." (Judgment No. 13 (Indemnity) Ser. A, No. 17, 
p. 2 9) 
Although in its pronouncements on the obligation to make 
reparation and the non-necessity of establishing jurisdiction, 
the Court has confined itself to the breach of an agreement, 
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nevertheless it is conceivable that these various dicta apply 
equally to the breach of other international obligations. 
However, even if it is accepted that there is a duty to make 
reparation for the commission of a wrongful act, the Court's 
pronouncement on the non-necessity to establish jurisdiction 
needs closer analysis. 
Article 36(2) (d) of the Statute expressly provides as a 
head of jurisdiction, "the nature or extent of the reparation 
to be made for the breach of an international obligation". 
Prima facie therefore, it would seem that jurisdiction with 
respect to reparation has to be expressly conferred upon the 
Court. But on the other hand, it may be argued that this 
provision recognises and presupposes the existence of the rule 
that reparation is due on the breach of an international 
obligation, i.e. that the Court may hold one party liable to 
make reparation. It is only for deciding the "nature and 
extent" of the reparation to be made that consent is required 
of the parties before the Court. Indeed, this explanation 
seems logical for it would be futile to confer jurisdiction 
upon the Court to decide the nature or extent of any reparation 
without at the same time agreeing that the breach of an 
international obligation entails the obligation to make reparatio~~ 
44. By 1970, 46 States have made declarations under 36(2) of the 
Statute. Innone of these declarations have reservations 
been made to exclude the Court's jurisdiction with respect 
to the obligation to make reparation. Further, no 
reservations seem to have been made to exclude Article 
36(2) (d). Yearbook of the I.C.J. 1969-70, p. 51 et seq. 
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As such, Article 36(2) (d) confirms rather thand:i..sapproves of 
the rule set down in the Chorzow Factory case that the 
obligation to make reparation for the breach of an international 
obligation is a fundamental rule of international law independent 
of any consent given in an international instrument. 
However, although the Court may have jurisdiction to hold 
one State under an obligation to make reparation, conferment 
of jurisdiction is required for the Court to determine the 
nature and extent of the reparation. Article 36(2) (d) of 
the Statute confirms this. The Corfu Channel case, 1949, 
p. 4 also supports this view. 
In this case, submitted by special agreement, the 
following questions were submitted: 
"(1) Is Albania responsible under international law 
for the explosions which occurred on the 22nd October 
1946 in Albanian waters and for the damages and loss 
of human life which resulted from them and is there 
any need to pay compensation. 
(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law 
violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's 
Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy 
in Albanian waters."on the 22nd October and on the 
12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty 
to give satisfaction". 
(p. 6 - emphasised) 
Albania contended that the Special Agreement did not confer 
jurisdiction on the Court to assess the amount of compensation 
(p. 23). The Court agreed with Albania that the "text gives 
rise to certain doubts. If point (i) / i.e. the question of 
responsibility? is answered in the affirmative, it follows from 
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the establishment of responsibility that compensation is due, 
and it would be superfluous to add point (ii) /i.e. is there 
any duty to pay compensation~/ unless the parties had something 
else in mind than a mere declaration by the Court that 
compensation is due. 11 
45 
(pp. 23-24) The Court then traversed 
the origin of the Special Agreement and concluded that the 
common intention of both Albania and the United Kingdom was 
that point (ii) was not meant to be superfluous but rather as 
conferring jurisdiction on the Court to determine the nature 
and extent of the compensation due to the United Kingdom. 
One part of the reasons invoked by the Court for reaching 
this conclusion deserves some observation. Referring to the 
second question of the Special Agreement, i.e. whether the 
United Kingdom has a duty to give satisfaction, the Court 
noted that Albania has not disputed the competence of the Court 
to decide what kind of satisfaction is due to her. In the 
written pleadings, the Albanian Government contended that it 
was entitled to apologies (p. 25). Owing to this fact, the 
Court said: 
"lf, however, the Court is competent to decide what 
kind of satisfaction is due to Albania under the 
second part of the Special Agreement, it is difficult 
to see why it should lack competence to decide the 
amount of compensation which is due to the United 
Kingdom under the first part. The clauses used 
in the Special Agreement are parallel. It cannot 
be supposed that the Parties •.. intended to give 
them opposite meanings - the one as giving the 
Court jurisdiction, the other as denying such 
jurisdiction." (p. 26) 
45. This statement further re-affirms the rule that reparation 
is due on breach of an international obligation. 
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The intention of Albania was therefore found in the fact, 
inter alia, that it had asked for satisfaction. This point 
serves to illustrate, however, that in the international field, 
some lawyers, e.g. counsel for Albania, are of the opinion that 
the request for a "self-executing" or "pure" declaration by the 
Court is different from one asking for an 11 executory 11 decision, 
i.e. that one party is bound to do or to refrain from doing 
certain acts. The Court by equating both kinds of request 
seems to hold that no such difference exists from the point 
of view of the competence of the Court. 
To sum up therefore, it is concluded that the Court has 
jurisdiction to give 'executory' decisions obliging one party 
to make reparation to another party. The next section examines 
whether the Court has jurisdiction to give 'executory' decisions 
other than that for reparation. 
3. The Injunction 
An injunction in Anglo-American law is simply a judgment 
or order of a court directing a person or persons to refrain 
from doing some particular act or thing, or less often, to do 
some particular act or thing. It is an equitable remedy which 
originally could only be obtained in the Court of Chancery or 
. . 46 
the Court of Exchequer in equity. 
46. Petit, Equity and the Law of Trusts 361 (1970); Spry, 
Equitable Remedies 287 (1971). 
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The main purpose of this section is to examine whether the 
Court has jurisdiction to issue an injunctive decision in this 
sense or something similar. Having done this, we shall also 
examine some of the cases in some detail which have been brought 
before the Court requesting injunctive relief or relief of a 
similar nature. 
We have argued in the previous sections that there is in 
essence no difference between a declaratory judgment and an 
executory judgment because of the fact that the Court is 
47 
inclined to frame an executory judgment in a declaratory manner. 
The reason we gave for this practice of the Court is that it 
may be more proper for the high and respectful office of the 
Court if it gives its decisions in a courteous and dignified 
manner. Conversely, it may be said that the parties before 
the Court being either States or international organisations, 
these parties would normally be expected to carry out any 
obligations which may be imposed by the Court even though the 
actual framing of the obligations may only be phrased in polite 
terms. 
Consequently, it would seem that the question whether the 
Court would have jurisdiction to issue an injunction as in the 
domestic use of this word would not arise. The Court, by its 
practice, would simplypr-efer to "order" a party before it to do 
or abstain from doing certain acts. 
4 7. See supra, Pf.,1-70. 
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But this is not to say that the Court cannot give a 
decision whereby one party is obligated to perform certain acts 
or to refrain from performing other acts. This point has been 
d 1 . h 1 . . f h . 48 stresse a so in t e ear ier sections o t is paper. In 
short, the Court in giving a decision of an injunctive nature 
would simply frame its decision in a formula such as "State A 
is under an obligation to do / or to refrain from doin~/ acts Y". 
The conclusion therefore in the question of whether the 
Court has a power to issue an injunction as understood in the 
domestic sense is that it has such a power, provided that it 
is understood that the Court will exercise this power in such 
a way that it will not usually use such words as "direct" or 
"order" to a party before it. 
It is, however, doubtful whether the Court would entertain 
a claim based on the analogue of guia timet injunctions which 
is a fairly common form of relief sought in Anglo-American 
49 
domestic courts. A guia timet injunction seeks to protect 
a legal right or interest based on an injury which is merely 
threatened or apprehended. Its chief characteristic is that 
50 
no infringement of the plaintiff's right has yet occurred. 
The principles governing the issue of this injunction are the 
48. See supra, Pf- b~-t'7o 
49. Petit, op. cit., 367; Spry , op. cit., 340. 
50. Spry , op. cit., 340; Petit, op. cit., 367. 
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same as that applying for the breach of a right. Both are 
remedies to prevent the occurrence or continuation of future 
d
. 51 
reme ies. The jurisprudence of the present Court seems to 
be firmly grounded in the fact that the Court will not entertain 
a dispute without an element of illegality , i.e. that inter-
52 
national obligations are breached. 
Apart from the question of quia timet injunctions, we 
have argued that the Court has the power to issue a decision 
which obliges a party to do or to refrain from doing certain 
acts. 
The next question that arises is whether in a specific 
case of international pollution, it is necessary for one 
party to request the Court to expressly "declare" that the 
polluting party is under an obligation to refrain from 
continuing the act of pollution. It seems that if a State is 
declared by the Court to be committing an illegal act in 
polluting the territory of another State, it follows that the 
act being illegal should ipso facto cease. Again, we have 
d . . 1 · . 53 argue this in an ear ier section. Hence, it appears to 
51. Spry, id. 341. 
52. For instance, "The function of the Court is to state the 
law, but it may pronounce judgment only in connection 
with concrete cases where there exists at the time of 
adjudication an actual controv ersy involving a conflict 
of legal interests between the parties." Northern Cameroons, 
1963 at pp. 33-4. 
53. See supra, Ef. '7017 
87. 
be unnecessary for the injured State to ask for no more than 
a declaration that an illegal act has been committed. 
However, this view does not accord with the recent 
Australian Application to the Court in the Case Concerning 
54 
Nuclear Tests. In this case, Australia asks the Court "to 
adjudge and Declare that, ... the carrying out of further 
atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the South Pacific Ocean 
is not consistent with applicable rules of international law. 
AND TO ORDER that the French Republic shall not carry out any 
55 
further such tests". 
In contrast, the New Zealand Application merely'~KS THE 
COURT TO ADJUIX;E AND DECLARE: That the conduct by the French 
Government of nuclear tests ... constitutes a violation of New 
Zealand's rights under international law, and that these rights 
56 
will be violated by any further such tests". 
The Australian Application asking the Court to order that 
the French Republic shall not carry out further tests goes 
contrary to the two points made earlier, i.e. that an illegal 
act should ipso facto be discontinued by the wrongful State 
and that the practice of the Court has been that it will not 
"order" a party before it to refrain from doing certain acts 
54. 
55. 
56. 
Application filed in Registry on 9 May 1973. 
Id. p. 28. See also pp. 12-13, para. 19. 
Application filed in Registry on 9 May 1973, p. 16. 
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but may re-phrase such a request in less forceful terms. It 
would seem therefore that even if the Court accedes to 
Australia's request, it would probably re-phrase its "order" 
in this manner: that the French Republic is under an obligation 
not to carry out any further tests. 
The main problem remains, however, in whether it is in 
the first place necessary to make such a request. Since the 
request is made specifically, it implies that a mere declaration 
of illegality by the Court is insufficient to prevent France 
from further nuclear testing. It would therefore seem that 
some "applicable rules of international law" allow for the 
continuation of an illegal act. But if this is in fact the 
case, then it would seem futile to request for an "injunction". 
If a rule of international law exists such that an illegal act 
should be allowed to continue, this rule would imply that a 
plaintiff aggrieved by the illegal act can claim for some 
other remedy but not for a remedy of injunction. A claim 
for an injunctive relief in the face of such a rule would 
simply be self-contradictory. It would seem therefore that 
the specific Australian request appears to be incomprehensible. 
Finally, before we turn to the cases, it will be well to 
bear in mind that it is not the function of the Court to see 
to the execution of its judgments. Furthermore, the Court 
would not contemplate the contingency that the parties will not 
comply with its judgments 56 a nor would it consider the manner 
89. 
1
. 57 
of comp iance. But it may consider whether a judgment if 
rendered would be susceptible of compliance or execution at 
58 
a time in the future. 
4. Some Cases Requesting Relief in the Nature of an Injunction 
The main object of this sub-section is to examine some 
relevant cases in an attempt to see whether an "injunction" 
has been requested to prevent the further occurrence of an 
illegal act. Secondly, it is also hoped to illustrate by 
the following cases how an 'injunctive' relief may be 
appropriate in which type of cases. 
(1) The Chorzow Factory (Indemnity) Ser. A, No. 17, p. 4. 
In this case, the German Government submitted, after 
several amendments to its original submission, inter alia, 
the following relief: 
11 (3) that until June 30th, 1931, no nitrated lime 
and no nitrate of ammonia should be exported to 
Germany, to the United States of America, to 
France or to Italy1 
in the alternative, that the British Government 
should be obliged to cease from exploiting the 
factory or the chemical equipment for the 
production of nitrate of ammonia etc;" (p. 12) 
The original application by Germany asked the Court "To give 
judgment ... to the effect:" (Ser. C, No. 13-1, p. 107) (1 Hudson 581) 
56a. S.S. Wimbledon, Ser. A, No. 1 at p. 32; Chorzow Factory, 
Ser. A., No. 13 at p. 63. 
57. Hayra de la Torre, 1951, p. 79. 
58. Northern Cameroons, 1968, at p. 37. 
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Here therefore is clearly a submission for injunctive 
relief - a prohibitory injunction in Anglo-American domestic 
law terminology. It should be noted that two injunctions 
were sought by Germany, one prohibiting export, the other 
prohibiting the further exploitation of the factory. 
With respect to whether the Court has power to issue 
an injunction generally, the Court seemed to have left this 
. 59 
question open. But this statement was only confined to 
the first injunction, namely, that of prohibiting exports. 
Although the Court left the question of injunction open, that 
did not prevent it from assessing the merits of whether the 
second injunction should be granted. In effect, therefore, 
it would seem that the judgment on this part of the submissions 
is useful in evaluating the Court's approach to submissions of 
this nature although it must be noted that the Court's consider-
ation was confined mainly to the facts of the case before it. 
The Court recognises in the first place that both 
submissions were directed not to damage already sustained but 
. 
solely to damage which the Bayer~sche might suffer in the 
future (p. 5 7) . This recognition is identical to the notion 
of injunction in Anglo-American domestic law. 
59. "The Court need not deal with the question whether such 
a prohibition ... might form the subject of an injunction 
issued by the Court to a government .... " (p. 59). 
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With respect to the first submission, the Court rejected 
it on several grounds. In the first place, it held that the 
German Government's allegation of competition to the Bayerische 
had not been sufficiently proved. Furthermore, the Court 
could not take into account possible but contingent and 
indeterminate damage. The German Government also argued that 
it based its claim on a restrictive covenant - "a fair and 
equitable licensing contract" between the Bayerische and any 
third party. The Court also rejected this argument on the 
basis that the prohibition if granted would in effect be a 
compensation to the Bayerische and such a compensation was 
already included in the Court's earlier consideration of the 
compensation due to the Bayerische (pp. 56-9). The point 
therefore which arises out of this consideration by the Court 
is that a party may not ask for monetary compensation in a 
disguised form, e.g. a prohibitory injunction. But it is 
conceivable that monetary compensation is not the only remedy 
that a plaintiff State may seek although on the facts of this 
case, the German Government was merely seeking to protect the 
financial position of the Bayerische. 
With regard to the second submission, i.e. prohibition 
of the operation of the factory, the Court held that the 
award of compensation included damage which may arise out of 
the operation of the factory: 
"/W/hen that compensation, which is to cover 
future prospects and will consist in a sum of 
money bearing interest, has been paid, the Polish 
Government will have acquired the right tocontinue 
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working the undertaking as valued, more especially 
as the Parties agree that the factory shall remain 
in the hands of the Polish Government" (p. 59). 
In other words, therefore, the Court seems to be saying that 
Poland by paying the required compensation has bought the 
right to continue operation of the Chorzow factory. The 
transaction in essence became a sale and purchase transaction. 
The case seems to offer little advancement to the question 
whether that illegal act should be prevented from being further 
committed. The illegal act in this case was the wrongful 
expropriation of the Chorzow factory but the German Government 
in its plea for injunctive relief was not directing its claim 
to this fact, i.e. that the wrongful expropriation should 
discontinue. In fact, it would seem irrelevant to speak of 
an injunctive relief in this sense as the illegal act was not 
a continuing one. Rather, the German Government was requesting 
through the injunction compensation for the commission of the 
illegal act. This the Court refused to give as they were 
already amply compensated for. 
(2) Diversion of Water from the River Meuse, Ser. A/B, 
No. 70, p. 4. The dispute in this case was about certain 
measures taken by Belgium, including projected measures in 
the construction of the Albert Canal. The Netherlands 
Government alleged that these measures were contrary to a 
Treaty between the two States. It asked the Court to "adjudge 
and declare" these measures (to which it specifically referred) 
as contrary to the Treaty of May 12th, 1863. Having done this 
93. 
it added in the Application: 
"II. To order Belgium 
(a) to discontinue all the works referred to under 
I(a) and to restore to a condition consistent with 
the Treaty of 1863 all the works constructed in 
breach of that Treaty; 
(b) to discontinue any feeding held to be contrary 
to the said Treaty and to refrain from any further 
such feeding." (p. 6) 
The Court found the substantive submissions of the 
Netherlands not made out. Consequently, "it can only reject 
the claim presented by the Netherlands Government in respect 
of penalties to be imposed upon the Belgian Government and 
is not called upon to examine this claim". (p. 28) 
Several points on injunctive relief arise out of this case 
which may be discussed. In the first place, the Court 
described the injunctive relief as "penalties". This seems 
to imply that the Court considered the injunctive relief sought 
as an enforcement measure rather than an obligation arising 
out of the breach of the Treaty of 1863. But it is an accepted 
view that it is not the function of the Court to concern itself 
60 
with enforcement measures. Even in domestic Anglo-American 
law, the granting of an injunction is not considered as a penalty. 
The common remedy for failure to comply with an injunctive order 
60. "There are specific forms of relief with which we are 
familiar, but it is important to be clear on certain 
factors relating to the judicial function. The making 
of such orders is part of the judicial function. Their 
enforcement is not. This is a matter for the executive." 
Vallat, Declaratory Judgments, Current Legal Problems 1964, 
p. 3. Although Vallat is speaking generally, his point 
relates as much to the Court. 
61 
is contempt of court. 
94. 
62 
However, one writer seems to be of 
the view that certain decisions of international tribunals 
may require the granting of an injunction. In particular, 
Jenks feels that an injunction is effective to secure the 
enforcement of an international decision which involves a 
. . . . 63 
continuing obligation. With respect, the writer submits 
that it is judicially impossible to accept this view. Since 
the Court is only concerned with stating the law and the 
obligations of the parties arising therefrom, a judgment in 
the form of an injunction would be no more than an obligation. 
No doubt, an injunction may serve to specifically pin-point 
a particular obligation and as such gives added weight for 
compliance. But the ultimate enforcement of an injunction 
lies with a body other than the Court. 
Another point which may be noted in this case is that the 
Court is asked to "order" Belgium in Part II of the submission. 
It is to be queried whether Belgium was invoking the "order" 
provision of the Statute (Article 48). Orders of the Court 
. . . 64 
are generally not "binding" upon the parties. The Court 
in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex case 
explains this well: 
61. Spry, Equitable Remedies, 334. 
62. Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication, 682. 
63. He cites the Trail Smelter Case as an example. 
64. But note, Rosenne, Vol. 1, p. 120 and Vol. II, 630 et seq. 
95. 
"f~/rders made by the Court, although as a general 
rule read in Open Court ... hav~ no 'binding' 
force (Article 59 of the Statute) or 'final' 
effect (Article 60 of the Statute) in deciding 
the disputes brought by the Parties before the 
Court;" (Ser. A, No. 22 at p. 13) 
The word "order" therefore must have been intended by 
the Netherlands as having the literal meaning, i.e. directing 
one person to do or refrain from doing certain acts. It may 
also have originated from the Anglo-American domestic law of 
injunction where previously injunctions were issued as "orders" 
of the Court - a requirement pursuant to the domestic procedural 
66 
codes. 
Finally, the individual opinion of Judge Hudson seems to 
imply firmly that the Court has the power to issue relief of 
an injunctive nature in appropriate circumstances. Judge Hudson 
seems to be of the view that when an injunctive relief is sought 
of the Court, the principles of equity applicable in Anglo-
American law may also be applied by the Court. In this respect, 
he held that the Netherlands' claim could not be entertained 
even if Belgium has acted contrary to the Treaty of 1863. 
This was because the Netherlands was herself in breach of 
65. Petit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, 361 (1970). 
66. The application by the Netherlands (Ser. C, No. 81, 
p. 10) used the words "To enjoin". This again seems 
to have its derivation from the Anglo-American, and 
perhaps, Continental, domestic law. 
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certain obligations of the Treaty and was unwilling to remedy 
this breach (p. 78). 
One statement of the learned Judge which touches on the 
difference between 'pure' declaratory judgments and 'executory' 
judgments may be noted: 
"In some systems of national jurisprudence where the 
process of sanction is highly developed, a line 
might be drawn between requests for injunctions 
and requests for declaratory judgments, the 
principle of equity being applied to the former 
but not to the latter. In international 
jurisprudence, however, sanctions are of a 
different nature and they play a different role, 
with the result that a declaratory judgment will 
frequently have the same compulsive force as a 
mandatory judgment; States are disposed to 
respect the one not less than the other. Hence, 
as a general rule, it would seem that a principle 
of equity applicable to a request for an injunction 
should be applied also to a request for a 
declaratory judgment. Neither request should be 
granted where the circumstances are such that the 
judgment would disturb that equality which is equity." 
Although the learned Judge is more concerned with the 
principles of equity governing requests for both declaratory 
judgments and mandatory judgments 1 his assumption that mandatory 
judgments are available in the Court suggests that the remedy 
of injunction may not involve a different concept from a 
declaratory judgment. In fact, as the learned Judge points 
out, both judgments are entitled to equal respect by States. 
But unfortunately, the case falls short of establishing 
the point that an injunctive request is required to prevent 
further commission of illegal acts. The Court was not given 
the opportunity to consider the injunctive request of the 
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Netherlands Government, namely, to discontinue the impugned 
works and to restore the position to the status guo. 
(3) Phosphates in Morocco, Ser. C., No. 84, p. 10 
(Application). This case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
Ser. A/B, No. 74, p. 10. The Application contains, inter alia, 
a submission requesting a relief in the nature of a mandatory 
injunction. The Application prayed the Court to "adjudge and 
declare~ inter alia: 
11 (b) alternatively, that the decision of the 
Mines Department dated January 8th, 1925 and 
the denial of justice which followed it, are 
inconsistent with the international obligation 
incumbent upon Morocco and upon France to respect 
the rights acquired by the Italian company 
Miniere e Fostati, and therefore that the 
Protectorate authorities are bound to recognise 
the said company as discoverer, and to invite 
tenders without delay for the working of the 
deposits covered by the company's licences f 
11 
(emphasised) 
Hence, it is seen that the submission not only asked for 
a declaration that the decision of the Mines Department was 
contrary to international law, but also requested an appropriate 
remedy arising out of this violation. 
(4) Pajzs, Csaky and Esterhazy case, Ser. A/ B, No. 68, 
p. 30. Although this case was decided in favour of the 
Re spondent on the merits, one aspect of the Hungarian submissions 
may be noted: 
"2. To order the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in 
particular: 
(a) in its attitude and proceedings, strictly to 
conform in all circumstances to the interpretation 
and application of Agreements II and III so laid 
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down as correct, and to respect the rights of 
which the existence was assumed by those 
Agreements; 
(b) to make good the damage .... 11 (pp. 33-4) 
(5) Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria. 
In the Application by the Belgian Government, it sought 
as relief: 
11 (B) and to order the requisite reparation in 
respect of the above-mentioned acts to be made. 11 
(Court Document, Dis.tr. 4010 (1938)) 
4 Hudson 389 at 393. 
This relief was elaborated in the Memorial submitted: 
11 (B) To order the respondent Party to take all 
administrative, legislative or other measures 
necessary: 
1. To reinstate the Electricity Company of Sofia 
and Bulgaria in its rights as against both the 
State of Bulgaria and the Municipality, also as 
against any public or private consumer of current; 
2. To ensure repayment .... 11 (Ser. A/ B, No. 7 7, 
at p. 68) 
The Court did not have the opportunity to consider this 
interesting submission owing to the case being withdrawn by 
67 
consent. 
(6) Societe Cornrnerciale De Belgique, Ser. A/ B, No. 78, 
p. 160 (Belgium v. Greece). The Greek Government concluded 
an agreement on 27th August, 1925, with the above-named Belgian 
company for the construction and reconstructionof certain railway 
lines. The agreement provided for disputes to be submitted to 
an arbitration commission. By 1932, the Greek Government owed 
67. Hudson, 41 A.T.I.L. 1 (1947). 
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the Belgian company a large amount of debt. Owing to a 
financial crisis prevailing in Greece the company faced 
difficulties in getting the debt paid by the Greek Government. 
The company decided to bring this matter to arbitration. 
The Arbitration Commission gave two awards, the first cancelling 
the contract and the second holding the Greek Government liable 
to pay the Company a fixed sum of "gold dollars" together with 
interest. The Greek Government refused to pay this sum 
awarded as an ordinary debt. Instead, it contended that it 
regarded the debt as part of the external debt of the country 
and one that could only be met on the same footing as the 
external debt. 
On the 4th May 1938, the Belgian Government applied to 
the Court in exercise of its diplomatic protection to the 
company (pp. 165-170). 
In the Application, the Belgium Government sought a 
declaration that the Greek Government had violated its 
international obligation and to ask the Court to assess the 
amount of compensation. Ser. C, No. 87, pp. 8-9. 
The Belgian Memorial repeated the first allegation and 
added: 
"B. To order the State of Greece in c:0ns equence 
to pay to the Belgian Government ... the sums due 
C. To authorise the Belgian Government to assess 
the additional damages sustained, either by it or 
by its national ... as a result of the facts set 
out above" (p. 162) 
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The Greek Government initially sought to discuss all of 
the Belgian claims (p. 163) but eventually submitted an 
alternative submission on May 17th,1939: 
"(3) To place on record for the benefit of the 
Belgian Government that the Greek Government 
acknowledges that the arbitral awards of January 
3rd and July 25th, 1936, have the force of res 
judicata, subject to the express reservation 
that it is unable to execute them as formulated; 
II (p. 163) 
The Belgian Government on the same day in reply to this 
alternative submission, requested the Court: 
"A To adjudge and declare that all the provisions 
of the arbitral awards given ... are without reserve 
definitive and obligatory for the Greek Government; 
B. Consequently to adjudge and declare: 
1. That the Greek Government is bound in law 
to execute the said awards; 
2. That the conditions for the settlement of 
the Greek external public debt ... are and must 
remain foreign to the execution of these awards; 
3. That it is without right or title that the 
Greek Government has sought to impose upon the 
Company or the Belgian Government, as a condition 
precedent to payment, either the methods of 
settlement of its external debt or the sacrifice 
of other rights of the Company recognised by the 
arbitral awards;" (p. 164) 68 
The Court, by thirteen votes to two: 
"l. Admits submission A of the Belgian Government 
fi.e. that the awards were definitive and obligatory/ 
68. Further minor amendments were made to the Greek submissions 
(p. 164). The Court expressed its opinion that in normal 
circumstances the various amendments proposed by Belgium 
would not be allowed as it would "transform" the nature 
of the dispute and prejudice the interests of third States 
(p. 173). However, it allowed the various amendments 
on the "special circumstances of this case". 
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and submission No. 3 of the Greek Government /i.e. 
acknowledgement that the awards were res judicata/ 
and, noting the agreement between the Parties, 
states that the arbitral awards made on January 3rd 
and July 25th, 1936, between the Greek Government 
and the Societe cornrnerciale de Belgique are 
definitive and obligatory; 
2. Dismisses the other submissions of the two 
Parties." (p. 178) 69 
The case illustrates the use that may be made of the 
Court's "purely" declaratory judgments. From the submissions 
of the Parties regarding the status of the arbitral awards, 
the Court came to the conclusion that the two Parties are "in 
agreement 11 • The Belgian Government asks the Court to say that 
the arbitral awards have the force of res judicata, and the 
Greek Government asks the Court to declare that it recognises 
that they possess this force. (p. 175) At this stage, it 
would seem that no dispute exists between the two parties 
and hence there is no jurisdiction for the Court to pronounce 
on the status of the awards, or rather, submission A of Belgium. 
Yet, the Court agreed to the Belgian submission that the awards 
were definitive and obligatory. The Court interpreted the 
Belgian submission as ''simply to get the Court to record the 
legal situation established by the arbitral awards between the 
parties as a result of the Greek Government's acknowledgement 
of the validity and binding force of those awards". 
70 
(p. 175) 
69. The final submissions of the two parties accepted by the 
Court were by the Belgian Government on May 17th and the 
Greek Government on May 19th (p. 173). 
70. Cf. this dictum in the Northern Cameroons case, 1963, p. 15 
at p. 34, "The function of the Court is to state the law, 
(cont'd on next page) 
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It is to be noted too that the Court expressly interpreted 
this declaration as neither conferring nor annulling the two 
arbitral awards either wholly or in part (p. 174). In effect 
therefore, what the Court seems to be doing is to lend its 
authoritative pronouncements on a legal situation which has 
already been authoritatively pronounced upon, viz., by the 
Arbitration Commission and accepted by the Parties as binding. 
This function of the Court highlights the use that may be made 
of "purely" declaratory judgments. 
The consequences arising out of this declaration are 
also clarified when the Court comes to consider submission B 
of the Belgian Government (see supra). The Court held that 
this submission is "neither necessary nor disputed": 
"The submission is expressly presented as a 
consequence of the preceding submission and 
therefore of the existence of res judicata. 
It is in fact clear that everything in the 
three paragraphs of this submission follows 
logically from the definitive and obligatory 
character of arbitral awards. If the awards 
are definitive and obligatory, it is certain 
that the Greek Government is bound to execute 
them and to do so as they stand." (p. 176) 
It will be recalled that the Belgian submission B(l) 
asked the Court "to adjudge and declare that the Greek 
70. (cont'd) but it may pronounce judgment only in connection 
with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the 
adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict 
of legal interests between the parties. The Court's 
judgment must have some practical consequence in the 
sense that it can affect existing legal rights or 
obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty 
from their legal relations." 
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Government is bound in law to execute the said awards". Such 
a request has the character of a mandatory injunction, i.e. that 
a party is bound to do a certain act. But the Court refused 
to entertain this request for the reasons given in the 
immediately above passage cited. As such, this holding by 
the Court may be taken as an illustration that it may in 
certain circumstances refuse even to give a mandatory request 
1 h h . h 1 1 d · h 
71 
at oug it as c ear y one so in ot er cases. But aside 
from this point and the point illustrating the use of a 
"purely" declaratory judgment, the case offers no help in 
deciding whether an injunction is required to prohibit the 
commission of an illegal act. 
(7) The Interhandel Case, 1959, p. 6. 
The claim of the Swiss Government in this case as 
conceived by the Court was essentially expressed in two 
propositions: 
(1) The Court was asked to adjudge and declare 
that the Government of the United States was 
under an obligation to restore the assets of 
Interhandel 
(2) The Court was asked to adjudge and declare 
that the United States was under an obligation 
to submit the dispute to arbitration or to a 
conciliation procedure. (p. 19) 
The case was dismissed on the Court upholding the United 
States' Third Preliminary Objection, that Interhandel had not 
exhausted the local remedies available to it in the United States 
71. See the Ambatielos case, I.C.J., 1953, p. 10; Temple of 
Preah Vihear case, 1962, p. 6. 
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Court (p. 30). But it is well to note the nature of the Swiss 
claim. Both claims purport to impose a positive duty upon the 
United States to act in a certain manner. In Anglo-American 
domestic law terminology, they may be described as requests 
for mandatory injunctions. 
In the course of the proceedings, the Swiss Government 
also requested for a declaratory judgment to the effect that 
the United States was in breach of Article IV(l) of the 
Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946. But the Court refused 
to entertain this request on the ground that it was concerned 
with the merits of the case and that proceedings upon the merits 
of the case had already been suspended (p. 20). The implication 
therefore was that this request would be considered when the 
Court comes to consider the merits of the case. 
Assuming that the Court found itself having jurisdiction 
to decide upon the merits, this case may illustrate the difference 
between a request for reliefs in the nature of a mandatory 
injunction and prohibitory injunction. The granting of a 
mandatory injunction, i.e. the finding by the Court that one 
party is bound to do certain acts depends on the substantive 
law being breached. Hence, in this case, although the Court 
may declare that the United States has acted contrary to the 
Washington Accord of 1946, still the obligations incumbent 
upon the United States following from this breach are to be 
found in the Washington Accord of 1946. In this respect, the 
relief sought in this case is similar to the relief sought in 
the Haya de la Torre case, 1951, p. 71, i.e. that Senor de la 
Torre be delivered by Colombia to Peru. We have seen that in 
this case, the Court held that this was not provided by the 
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Havana Convention. The only obligation the Court held to be 
incumbent upon Colombia was to cease granting the asylum to 
Senor de la Torre. On the other hand, in the Temple of Preah 
Vihear case, 1962, p. 6, Thailand was found bound to deliver 
the religious scriptures back to Cambodia because the 
substantive law of State sovereignty required this. The 
obligation was "implicit in, and consequential upon, the claim 
of sovereignty itself" (p. 36). 
But it also appears that if a litigant state is contented 
to ask merely for a prohibitory injunction, i.~. that the State 
committing the illegal act refrain the continuation of that act, 
it need not go further than to assert that there has been a 
breach of an international obligation and that this breach must 
cease to continue. Obviously, in the Interhandel case, the 
Swiss Government would not be satisfied with merely requesting 
a prohibitory injunction that the United States desist from 
further breaching the Washington Accord of 1946. In this 
respect, a request for relief by a prohibitory injunction is 
irrelevant for cases of this type. But it becomes very 
relevant in cases of international pollution as the main 
concern of the polluted State would be to see that the 
pollution is not allowed to continue. Again, this case offers
 
no guidance as to which such an injunction is necessary to 
prevent the act of pollution. 
(8) Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian 
Territory, 1960, p. 6. Portugal claims, inter alia, in 
the 
Application, 
"(c) To adjudge that India should put an immediate 
end to this de facto situation by allowing Portugal 
to exercise the above-mentioned right of passage in 
the conditions herein set out." (p. 10) 
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In the Memorial of Portugal, this claim is amplified as 
follows: 
"2. To adjudge and declare: 
(a) That the Government must respect that right; 
(b) that it must therefore abstain from any act 
capable of hampering or impeding its exercise; 
(c) that neither may it allow such acts to be 
carried out on its territory; 
3 • • •• 
4. To call upon the Government of India to put an 
end to this unlawful state of affairs." (p. 10) 
The final submissions of Portugal asked, inter alia, 
"that the right of passage between the enclaves of 
Dadra and Nagar-Aveli and between these enclaves 
and the coastal district of Daman, as defined above, 
is a right possessed by Portugal and which must be 
respected by India." (p. 12, emphasised) 
Portugal recognised that under certain conditions, the 
right of passage may be suspended. For this, its final 
submissions for relief of an injunctive nature read: 
"l. If the Court is of opinion that the above-
mentioned conditions which must be satisfied to 
justify the suspension of the passage of Portugese 
armed forces are not fulfilled, 
To adjudge and declare 
That India must end the measures by which it opposes 
the exercise of the right of passage of Portugal; 
2. If the Court is of opinion that the above-
mentioned conditions which must be satisfied to 
justify the suspension of the passage of Portugese 
armed forces are fulfilled, 
To adjudge and declare 
That the said passage shall be temporarily suspended; 
but that this suspension shall end as soon as the 
course of events discloses that the justification 
for the suspension has disappeared; 
That during such suspension, India must abstain from 
any measure which might strengthen the position of 
the adversaries of the lawful Government in the 
enclaves and thus provoke the aggravation or 
prolongation of the circumstances relied upon in 
support of that suspension; 
That there is no legitimate reason entitling India 
to ask that the other forms of the exercise of the 
right of passage should likewise be suspended." 
(pp. 19-20). 
Submission (1) above illustrates Portugal's view that the 
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commission of an illegal act entails as a consequence of that 
illegality the cessation of the further commission of that act. 
In submission (2), Portugal was not asserting the commission 
of an illegal act as such but that the recognition of a right 
of passage as such entails consequences appropriate to such 
recognition. 
The Court found eventually that Portugal did not have the 
alleged right of passage with respect to its armed forces and 
hence the submissions above were not considered. But it is 
interesting to note that in the course of the judgment, the 
Court did not cast aspersions on the nature of the Portugese 
"injunctive" claims. At p. 31 the Court made passing 
references to the Portugest claims in a seemingly approving 
manner. Similarly, at p. 34, the Court seems to recognise 
the necessity for "redress"of the illegal situation flowing 
from that failure, i.e. India's failure to comply with its 
obligations. Finally, the question of remedy was again 
referred to when the Court came to consider the merits of the 
case (p. 36) . But these passing references to the remedy 
arising out of India's failure to comply with her obligations 
can hardly be conclusive of the point that it is necessary to 
ask the Court to declare that a party committing an illegal 
act must discontinue the act. 
point. 
The Court did not decide the 
All the above cases discussed do not seem to throw any 
light as to whether an illegal act should be discontinued by a 
specific request of the Court. But as the cases show, some 
States do ask for such a request. The Court's response to 
such a request has not been declared simply because for one 
reason or another, it has never had the opportunity to consider 
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such requests. On the other hand, the Cour
t has given requests 
of a mandatory nature. 
remains unanswered. 
The question of a prohibitory request 
However, it is submitted on the basis of t
he dictum in 
72 
the Haya de la Torre case as adopted in th
e Namibia case 
that it seems to be an inexorable rule tha
t a State committing 
an illegal act must refrain from further c
ommitting that act. 
CONCLUSION 
International pollution by its nature part
akes of a 
continuing process of harm being done to t
he environment, 
either generally or to the territory of a 
particular State. 
We have attempted in the first part of thi
s paper to show that 
it is unlawful for one State to allow its 
territory to be used 
in such a manner so as to cause injury to 
the territory of 
another State by pollution. 
In the second part of this paper we have c
onsidered mainly 
the question of the nature of the Court's 
declaratory judgment. 
In particular, we have tried to show that 
although the Court 
may only "declare" the rights and obligati
ons of the parties 
before it, this does not mean that the par
ties are not 
obligated to do or not to do a certain act
. Our inquiry into 
the question of whether the Court has the 
power to issue a 
decision which has the character of a proh
ibitory injunction 
as understood in domestic law seems to be 
that the Court does 
have such a power. But, we have
 argued that it may not be 
necessary for a party to specifically requ
est for the cessation 
of an illegal act as ipso facto an illegal
 act must cease for 
72. See supra, p.'7/ , 
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otherwise the whole purpose of law would be subverted. 
The concern of States in matters of pollution is to see 
that the illegal pollution of its territory ceases. Hence, 
this provides a further justification for our excursion into 
the question of the prohibitory injunction. 
Finally, it must be stressed that notevery int~~sion of 
polluting substances into the territory of a State necessarily 
constitutes an illegal act. In these days of heavily 
industrialised neighbouring States, a proposition to this 
effect would stifle alnost all industrial activity around the 
borders of such States. For a claim of pollution to succeed 
the Court must be convinced that the harm caused poses an 
irreparable danger to the environment as well as to health. 
*** 
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